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This thesis examines the extent to which modern maneuver warfare theory is relevant 
to naval warfare and the US Navy's new strategic concept. This question is important 
because Naval Doctrine Command, established to translate the strategic vision of" ... From 
The Sea" into doctrinal reality, seized upon the concept of maneuver warfare in Naval 
Warfare (Naval Doctrine Publication One) as the most appropriate war fighting style for the 
naval services. Modern maneuver warfare theory was developed from land warfare 
experience to solve specific problems of that warfare medium. The current body of literature 
treating the adoption of maneuver warfare by the naval services does not address the 
question of its relevance at sea or in the littoral. This thesis develops a framework for 
determining the relevance of maneuver warfare to the naval services by defining the concept 
and describing its essential elements. It then examines why the US Army and Marine Corps 
adopted maneuver warfare in the nineteen-eighties. The thesis concludes that the littoral 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The United States Navy is in the midst of a period of major innovation. As the result 
of major changes in the international security environment, it is changing its traditional 
strategic focus and doctrine from the concepts of the "Maritime Strategy" to those of 
"Forward ... From The Sea." This shift matches Stephen Rosen's definition of a major 
innovation as one that includes: 
... a change in the concepts of operations of [a] combat arm, that is the 
ideas governing the way it uses its forces to win a campaign, as opposed to 
tactical innovation which is a change in the way individual weapons are 
applied to the target and environment in battle. A major innovation also 
involves a change in the relation of that combat arm to other combat arms and 
a downgrading or abandoning of older concepts of operations and possibly of 
a formerly dominant weapon1• 
At first glance, the debate surrounding this innovation resembles that of the period 
towards the end of the Second World War when Bernard Brodie observed: 
We live in a time when basic theories of naval warfare are being 
rejected out of hand by responsible officers on the wholly unwarranted 
assumption that they do not fit modem conditions. 2 
1Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning The Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military. 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991) 7-8. 
2Brodie, Bernard. A Guide to Naval Strategy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1944) 12. 
1 
The similarity in resemblance between the present debate and the one at the end of the 
Second World War is purely superficial. "Modern conditions" oftoday's security 
environment are entirely different. Basic theories of naval warfare, and other warfare media, 
are rightly being scrutinized. 
In 1992 Colin Gray, reaffirming "traditional" theories of sea power, said in The 
Leverage of Sea power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War, that: 
Experience has shown that reports of the strategic demise or even 
obsolescence of sea power have been greatly exaggerated. Sea power in this 
century has co-opted or otherwise neutralized every takeover challenge that 
has appeared. 3 
The US Navy does not believe that sea power per se is obsolete. However, the new strategic 
focus ofthe US Navy explicitly rejects traditional "blue water" theories of naval warfare as 
overtaken by events, while it attempts to co-opt aspects of warfare in other physical media. 
In contrast with Brodie's view fifty years ago, the present debate is not "wholly 
unwarranted." 
A major part of the US Navy's reaction to the present security environment has been 
an attempt to adapt the concept of "maneuver warfare" to seagoing forces. Most of the 
literature on the subject is derived from and focuses on ground combat. What little 
discussion exists with respect to naval warfare has been borrowed lock-stock-and barrel from 
3Gray, Colin S. The Leverage of Sea power: The Strategic Advantage ofNavies in War. 
(New York: The Free Press, 1992) 263. 
2 
concepts of maneuver warfare on land with little or no discussion whether those concepts are 
relevant to the operations of seagoing forces. 
In describing maneuver warfare in Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, 
Naval Doctrine Command calls it " ... the preferable and more effective- albeit more difficult 
to master- fighting style."4 The role of doctrine has always been a contentious issue among 
naval officers ever since the Royal Navy's Permanent Fighting Instructions which were 
frequently seen as having stifled initiative and the ability to fight decisive battles. 5 
This long held skeptical view of"doctrine" among professional naval officers has led 
the US Naval Doctrine Command to tread lightly, and emphasize that doctrine is not 
"directive" but " ... form[s] a bridge between the naval component of our nation's military 
strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval 
Warfare Publications and Fleet Marine Force Manuals. "6 
The U.S. Navy's Naval Doctrine Command was created to translate the "vision" 
" ... From the Sea" into doctrinal reality. Specifically, it was tasked to " ... close the gap 
between the air-land battle and amphibious warfare, ... translate 'operational maneuver from 
the sea' into naval doctrine, and above all ... build doctrine for expeditionary warfare."7 This 
4Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare. (Washington DC: US Government 
Printing Office [US GPO], 28 March 1994) 33. 
5Hughes, Wayne P. Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1986) 48-49. 
6Naval Warfare. ii. 
7
" ... From The Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century." (Washington DC: 
(continued ... ) 
3 
was intended to be an interim step. The next step will presumably be to translate doctrine 
into practical applications for deployed forces. The Naval Doctrine Command's 
determination that maneuver warfare is the "preferred" way of war for the US Navy must be 
examined. This thesis will seek to answer the important, but previously unasked, question 
"To what extent are land warfare concepts of maneuver warfare relevant to naval warfare?" 
B. THE US NAVY'S CHANGING STRATEGIC FOCUS 
NDP 1 was intended to be the first of six publications which give substance to the 
Navy's new strategic concept : " ... From the Sea."8 This concept articulated the changed 
orientation of the U.S. naval services away from their traditional focus on command of the 
sea. US Navy Captain Edward A. Smith wrote a detailed explanation of how and why 
" ... From The Sea." evolved as a concept. He first described two underlying assumptions he 
claimed have not changed with the end of the Cold War: 
[ 1] naval forces would continue to be charged with the defense of American 
territory, lives, and property, and ... 
[2] the United States would continue to exercise a leadership role in the 
world9• 
7 ( ••• continued) 
US GPO, 1991) 12. 
8Naval Warfare. iv. 
9Smith, Edward A. "What ' ... From the Sea' Didn't Say". Naval War College Review 
XL VIII, no 1 (Winter 1995) 11. 
4 
Three important events or conditions have changed the US Navy's view of its role in 
the security environment: (1) the end of the Cold War, (2) Desert Storm, and (3) rapid 
technological change. The end of the Cold War has two related effects. First, the fall of the 
Soviet Union removed the US Navy's only global threat capable of challenging its command 
of the seas. According to Frank Uhlig, "Now, although almost every country has a navy, 
there is only one big capable navy- [the US Navy]."10 Next, the American victory in the 
Cold War has forced changes in the uses and usefulness of its naval forces. According to one 
author: " ... no nation on earth can challenge [the US Navy] in the foreseeable future; [its] 
traditional concept of war at sea has become irrelevant."11 
The United States and its navy are faced neither by peer competitors , nor permanent 
enemies. This does not mean that it expects an end to crises. Nevertheless, " ... given the 
inability to forecast future crises accurately, ... the naval service could not hope to plan forces 
or capabilities on the basis of any limited geographic concerns either now or (especially) 
over the long term."12 Lack of a specific enemy requires a broader focus on potential threats 
for naval forces. 
It was one of those crises, arising unexpectedly in 1990, that was the second major 
event that prompted the US Navy to seize upon the concept of maneuver warfare. Colin S. 
Gray said that Desert Shield and Desert Storm " ... demonstrated that the need for a maritime 
10Uhlig, Frank. "On, Over, Under, and From the Sea." Proceedings. (May 1995) 112. 
11Toti, William J. "Sea-Air-Land Battle Doctrine."Proceedings. (September 1992) 70. 
12Smith 17. 
5 
basis to U.S. power projection is mandated by an enduring strategic geography and has not 
evaporated with the demise of the Cold War."13 However, former Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens, found little encouragement in such words: 
Desert Storm, the first post-Cold War conflict was a magnificent battle 
-and a doctrinal disaster for the U.S. Navy. Our naval forces performed well. 
There was no failure on the part of the men and women who fought there. 
Desert Storm was a triumph of American military power and all the military 
services contributed to that triumph. The Navy was successful, however, 
largely because it was able to modify its operational doctrine that - along with 
the weapons, systems, and training it generated proved ill suited to the Gulf 
War14 
Owens said that, by contrast, the US Army and Air Force doctrines were correct. 
Developed to counter the Soviets in Europe, the Airland Battle doctrine was successfully 
applied to the Soviet trained and styled Iraqi Army. The US Navy's plan for fighting the 
Soviets, the Maritime Strategy, was not suited to the war with Iraq. Owens says that strategy 
gave the Navy an incorrect view of what war would be like, and left it ill prepared with the 
wrong weapons, command and control system, tactics, and concept of operations. 
Specifically, the Maritime Strategy envisioned a battle against Soviet naval and air forces in 
the vast, deep ocean areas. A premium was placed on fighting at a long distance, before the 
enemy closed to weapons release range. None of these conditions was present in the war 
13Gray, Colin S. The Nayy in the Post-Cold War World. (University Park Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994) 7. 
140wens, William A High Seas: The Naval Passage to An Uncharted World. 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995) 4. 
6 
with Iraq. That Gulf War for the Navy, according to Owens, became the " ... midwife of 
change."15 
The third major factor impacting the US Navy is the " ... accelerating pace of 
technological change."16 Through immense increases in range, accuracy, deadliness, and 
versatility, technology is blurring the already largely artificial boundaries between warfare 
media - land, sea, and air. These and other changes are commonly referred to as a 
"Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)." 
There is a growing body ofRMA related "literature". The consensus definition of the 
concept is that an RMA consists of a military technological revolution plus a changed 
doctrine or organization to most effectively use the technical revolution17• There are three 
broad views about the present period. Not everyone agrees that the world stands on the brink . 
of an RMA. Some argue that the world is in a period of evolutionary change. Ranges and 
other measures of performance for weapons and systems are increasing but these alone do 
150wens 4. 
16Smith 11. 
17Fitzsimonds, James R. and VanTol, Jan M. "Revolutions in Military Affairs." Joint 
Force Quarterly. (Spring 1994). 25-26. 
- Krepenivich, Andrew F. "Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern ofMilitary Revolutions." 
The National Interest, no 37. (Fall1994). 30. 
-Marshall, Andrew W. "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Acquisition and 
Technology, Senate Armed Services Committee." (5 May 1994). 1. 
-Vickers, Michael G. "The Emergence ofMultidimensional Warfare." (Lecture, United 
States Military Academy, West Point, 26 September 1994). 1. 
7 
not constitute a revolution 18• Another school of thought is that the real revolution has 
nothing to do with technology as such; the "real" revolution consists of the diminishing role 
of the state as the sole possessor of the legitimacy to use force. This school believes the 
nation - state is declining and the growth of subnational and supranational threats like 
terrorism, drugs, and AIDS are changing the nature ofwarfare. 19 
While the framers of " ... From The Sea" do not explicitly state which side of the 
argument they are on, they do not minimize the importance of the impact of technology on 
the security environment either. According to Smith, "the problems posed by the accelerating 
pace of technological change were the subject of much discussion .... "20 A main problem was 
seen as civilian technology advancing faster than mili~ary technology, thereby threatening to 
make US naval systems obsolete, or causing the US to be surprised. "From this perspective, 
then, a permanent state of accelerating technological change confronted military planners 
with the dual problem of how to maintain sufficient flexibility in both hardware and the 
acquisition process to take advantage of'offthe shelf civilian technology as it became 
available, and of how to deal with opponents who could do like wise."21 
18Galdi, Theodore. Revolution in Militaty Affairs? Competing Concepts. Organizational 
Responses Outstanding Issues. (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service). (30 
November 1990). 8-9. 
1<Fsuilder, Carl H. "Looking In All the Wrong Places? The Real Revolution in Military 
Affairs is Staring Us in the Face." Armed Forces Journal International. (May 1995) 38-
39. 
20Smith 18. 
21 Smith 18. 
8 
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Mundy says technology 
complicates the inherent problems of fighting in the littorals: "Complicating the situation will 
be the fact that the naval expeditionary task force will be spread from far out to sea to well 
inland, conducting multi-modal warfare against diverse threats. "22 
Also, James Tritten, of Naval Doctrine Command, who has done much to encourage 
the adoption of maneuver warfare by the US Navy, believes that due to advanced 
technologies, " ... simultaneous and decisive warfare of annihilation against the depth of an 
enemy's battle space is possible in today's environment."23 
It is also true that not everyone agrees that the US Navy is undergoing a significant 
change in focus. For example, LT Shawn D. James claims that " ... the elements of naval 
strategy over the past 40 years have changed only in their collective title. "24 Supporters of 
this school of thought say that the navies always have been oriented towards influencing 
some event on land. The reason the US Navy can devote direct effort to influencing land 
events now is because the primary reason for the existence of a fleet, to gain command of the 
sea, has been accomplished. According to this school, the situation Brodie described in 1944 
has changed very little: 
The conventional division ofthe globe into land and marine areas, 
controlled respectively by land and naval forces, has always been highly 
arbitrary. The fact that war at sea calls for different techniques than war on 
22Mundy, CarlE, Jr. "Getting it Right ' ... From the Sea'." Proceedings. (January 1944) 
71. 
23Tritten, James J. "Maneuver Warfare At Sea." Proceedings. (September 1995) 53. 
24James, Shawn D. " ... From The Bottom ofthe Sea". Proceedings. (June 1994) 26. 
9 
land tends to obscure the more fundamental truth that naval operations are 
important primarily because of their influence on land campaigns, and 
conversely, that many great land campaigns are carried through chiefly to 
secure an advantage in the war at sea. Moreover, there are large and 
important areas in which operations ashore and afloat, are associated in the 
most intimate manner.25 
"Traditionalists," for example Colin Gray, maintain that navies can do six things 
strategically: cause financial exhaustion, blockade, conduct peripheral raids, attack overseas 
possession and allies, gain continental allies, and eventually make "continental" 
commitments similar to the allied invasion ofNormandy.26 The last action is what the US 
Navy is concentrating on now. They acknowledge that naval power, by itself, can rarely, if 
ever, win a war; its actions enable victory. Again, to quote Gray: 
Navies fight at sea only for the strategic effect they can assure ashore, 
where people live. Sea battles, naval tactics, and ship design, are all means, 
and only means, to the gaining of strategic leverage in a conflict as a whole. 27 
Another maritime author, Frank Uhlig Jr, agrees with Gray's and Brodie's 
traditional view of sea power. He writes that come war, navies provide three basic "goods 
and services:" 
[1] ... ensure first that friendly shipping can flow .... 
[2] ... and second that hostile shipping cannot.. .. 
25Brodie 170. 
26Gray. Leverage. chp 2. 
27 Gray. Leverage. 1. 
10 
[3] ... then if it is necessary or desirable, navies can risk landing an army on a 
hostile shore, and supporting it then and thereafter with fire and logistics. 28 
The "traditionalists" minimize the profoundness of the change in the US Navy's 
strategic focus. Gray's quote only addresses the strategic level of naval "leverage." Uhlig's 
is too limited to describe what the Navy intends to do in future conflicts. The US Navy's 
new strategic focus goes far beyond recognition that the change in the security environment 
allows more effort to be expended influencing land events. " ... From The Sea" signifies that 
the US Navy intends to directly influence the land battle. This is to occur at all levels ofwar, 
not just at the strategic level. It intends to do much more than simply transport and land 
troops, supply them ashore, and perhaps provide fire support if needed. 
According to Jan S. Breemer, the US Navy " .. .is about to go through the most 
fundamental top-down revolution since the birth of the 'new navy' one hundred years ago."29 
And, he adds, " ... never before has a major navy relegated sea control and the preparation for 
the next 'big' war at sea to be a secondary consideration."30 
The Department ofthe Navy explained this shift in a 1994 white paper, 
"Forward ... From The Sea." It said: "Naval Forces have five fundamental and enduring roles 
in support of the National Security Strategy: projection of power from sea to larid, sea control 
and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic sea lift, and forward naval 
28Uhlig 112. 
2~reemer, Jan S. "The End ofNaval Strategy: Revolutionary change and the Future of 
American Naval Power. Strategic Review. (Spring 1994) 41. 
30Breemer 44. 
11 
presence."31 This order is not accidental. The primary role is projection of power from sea 
to land. 
The shift in emphasis is further demonstrated in the same document when it explains 
the role of the naval services in conflict:. 
Finally, if deterrence fails during a crisis and conflict erupts, naval 
forces provide the means for immediate sea-based reaction. This could 
include forcible entry and providing the protective cover essential to enabling 
the flow of follow on forces which will be deployed, supported, and sustained 
from the continental United States. 32 
This statement is as important for what it does not say, as it is for what it does, 
namely that future "enablement" from the sea will not be by way of a sequential strategic 
offensive eventually leading to landing of troops. Instead, the naval services will 
immediately and directly become active in a land conflict, including at the operational level 
of war. 
Owens: 
Breemer's belief in the revolutionary character ofthe US Navy's change is shared by 
" ... From The Sea" reorientates the primary focus ofU.S. naval forces 
from sea control to land control. Affecting events on land is not a new 
concern of naval forces. But in concert with the Marines (or mobile Army 
units) the navy's new operational concept goes far beyond the traditional 
notion of power projection to a broader concept, better understood as 
31Dalton, John H., Boorda, Jeremy M., and Mundy, Carl E. Jr. "Forward ... From The 
Sea." Proceedings. (December 1994) 49. 
32Dalton 4 7. 
12 
battlefield dominance ... But the new operational concept argues that the 
primary purpose ofU.S. naval power in conflict is now to help bring a desired 
outcome on the land, directly, and that the primary opposition the United 
States will face in doing this will be an opponent's ground force. 33 
C. ATTRITION AND MANEUVER WARFARE 
The US Navy's revolutionary change in strategic focus toward direct control of the 
enemy landmass and enemy ground-based capabilities has prompted the US Navy to 
investigate the concept of maneuver warfare. The Naval Doctrine Command views 
maneuver warfare as a distinct form of warfare. Its antithesis, it claims, is "attrition" 
warfare. According to Naval Doctrine Command, "Maneuver warfare is a philosophy, rather 
than a formula - an approach rather than a recipe ... [and] is further characterized by 
adaptability and is not limited to a particular environment. .. and emphasizes the indirect 
approach - not merely in terms of mobility and spatial movement, but also in terms of time 
and our ability to take action in before the enemy can counter us. "34 Its contrast is 
" ... attrition warfare- the wearing down of an enemy .... "35 
Since this definition is vague and because Naval Doctrine Command calls maneuver 
warfare " ... the preferable and more effective - albeit more difficult to master - fighting 
style ... ,"36 a few naval writers have attempted to develop or operationalize this concept. 
Mundy defines the concept as the ability to " ... project credible, sustainable power directly 
330wens 78-79. 
34Naval Warfare 33. 
35N a val Warfare 3 3. 
36Naval Warfare 33. 
13 
against a foes' center of gravity."37 Pierce says maneuver warfare attempts to " ... collapse the 
enemy's will to fight ... [and] ... shatter his cohesion ... "38 He also states that it " ... emphasizes 
non-linear tactics and decentralized command and control."39 Tritten says "Maneuver 
warfare planning must create opportunities to defeat enemy forces at sea by creating times 
and places where our own forces have the decisive edge."40 He also states that maneuver 
warfare is, 
... more art than science, [it] is about planning and executing skillful 
operations or combat actions that depend on mental agility rather than simply 
the application of brute force. Manoeuvre warfare doctrine creates favorable 
conditions for combat actions at sea in which one strives for the greatest 
possible return for the effort expended. 41 
Still another writer describes the purpose of maneuver warfare as " ... to defeat the 
enemy by disrupting his ability to react, rather than by physical destruction of his forces."42 
He uses the analogy of judo to further describe it: 
37Mundy 71. 
38Pierce, Terry. "Operational Maneuver From The Sea." Proceedings. (August 1944) 
30. 
39Pierce, Terry C. "Maneuver Warfare: From Theory to Practice." Proceedings. 
(November 1992) 62. 
40Tritten 54. 
41 Tritten 52. 
42Lind, WilliamS. Maneuver Warfare Handbook.(Boulder and London: Westview Press, 
1985) From "About the Author." 
14 
Maneuver warfare can be thought of as military judo. It is a way of 
fighting smart, out thinking an opponent you may not be able to overpower 
with brute strength. As such, it offers ... the best hope of winning the battles, 
the campaigns, and wars [U.S. forces] may face in the future. 43 
Besides its vagueness, a major shortcoming in the literature on maneuver warfare is 
that much of what it says about maneuver warfare at sea is contradictory. For instance, 
Tritten writes of an "indirect approach," while Mundy's description calls for a direct and 
sustainable attack on the enemy's center of gravity. Pierce and others stress the need for 
decentralized command and control, but Owens describes the US Navy's decentralized 
command and control during Desert Storm as a major doctrinal shock. The existing 
arrangement, he said, was ill suited for the battle and the environment. Owens' statement 
also contradicts Naval Doctrine Command's belief that maneuver warfare is 
" .... characterized by adaptability and is not limited to a particular environment."44 
Another criticism by analysts, like Hughes and Atkeson, is that maneuver warfare 
supporters seem to call maneuver warfare inherently good and attrition inherently bad. 
Furthermore, according to them, maneuver warfare advocates label almost all historically 
successful commanders as practitioners of maneuver warfare. 45 
43Lind 2. 
44Naval Warfare 33. 
45 Atkeson, Edward B. "Maneuvering Past Maneuver Warfare." Proceedings. (January 
1996) 33. 
-Hughes, Wayne P. "Naval Maneuver Warfare: An Outline for the Naval Doctrine 
Command." ( 3 November 1995) 1. 
15 
Robert H. Leonhard has a better developed definition of maneuver and attrition 
warfare. His study, The Art ofManeuver, criticized the US Army's AirLand Doctrine, 
however, his definitions of maneuver and attrition warfare are generic and relevant to 
explaining attrition and maneuver warfare at sea. They are also much more precise than the 
definitions offered in the naval literature. His definition of attrition warfare is: 
... That method of fighting wars, campaigns, and battles ... in which the 
friendly force attempts to defeat an enemy through the destruction of the 
enemy's mass. The key words in this definition are "destruction" and "mass". 
Attrition theory is a "bottom-up" approach to war because it focuses upon 
bringing the enemy to battle and then seeks to defeat him in that battle or 
follow on battles. 46 
He said that, because battles are the key element in attrition theory, operations and strategies 
are created which attempt to bring the enemy to battle and create a sustainable favorable loss 
ratio. The enemy is eventually defeated by being physically destroyed at a rate which cannot 
be sustained. 47 
He contrasts this with his definition of maneuver warfare as the warfare style which: 
... attempts to defeat the enemy through means other than simple 
destruction ofhis mass. Indeed the highest and purist application of maneuver 
theory is to preempt the enemy, that is to disarm or neutralize him before the 
fight. If such is not possible the maneuver warrior seeks to dislocate the 
enemy forces, i.e. removing the enemy from the decisive point or vice versa, 
thus rendering them useless and irrelevant to the fight. [If that cannot be 
accomplished], then the maneuver-warfare practitioner will attempt to disrupt 
46Leonhard, Robert R. The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand 
Battle. (Presidio, 1991} 19. 
4 7Leonhard 19. 
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the enemy, i.e., destroy or neutralize his center of gravity, preferably attacking 
with friendly strengths through enemy weaknesses. 48 
A further difference, according to Leonhard are the different views on the intangibles 
of warfare that are held by the adherents to the two schools. These intangibles exist in all 
forms of warfare and include, but are not limited to, such factors as morale and cohesion. 
According to Leonhard, "If the attrition addict appreciates war's intangibles at all, he sees 
them only as combat multipliers with which to fight the attrition warfare battle better."49 
Liddell Hart linked war's intangibles closely to his strategy of the "indirect approach." An 
example ofLiddell Hart's belief in the psychological or intangible basis ofvictory is 
summed up in his statement that "Helplessness induce[s] hopelessness, and history attests 
that loss of hope, not loss oflives, is what decides the issue ofwar."50 He cites the German 
surrender in 1918 as a case in point: 
.. .In preventing a continuance of the war into 1919, military action 
ranks foremost. This conclusion does not imply that, at the moment of the 
Armistice, Germany's military power was broken or her armies decisively 
beaten, nor that the Armistice was a mistaken concession. Rather does the 
record of the last "hundred days," when sifted, confirm the immemorial lesson 
that the true aim of war is the mind of the hostile rulers, not the bodies of their 
troops, that the balance between victory and defeat turns on mental 
impressions and only indirectly on physical blows. It was the shock ofbeing 
surprised, and the feeling that he was powerless to counter strategic moves 
48Leonhard 19-20. 
4~eonhard 19. 
50Liddell Hart, B. H. Strategy. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) 202. 
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that shook Ludendorff' s nerve more than the loss of prisoners, guns, and 
acreage. 51 
The view of warfare as a choice between attrition and maneuver is not without its 
critics. Atkeson says that the present experience of the US Navy is similar to the experience 
of the US Army a decade ago when it was trying to adopt maneuver warfare as a doctrinal 
concept. He denies the existence of the separate styles of warfare . 
. . . Maneuver warfare is supposed to be the opposite of attrition warfare. 
The former is Good; the latter is Bad .... The Army inflated the Good and 
condemned the Bad, that is, until the laws of physics and common sense 
caught up with it. 52 
To Atkeson, the laws of physics and common sense reaffirmed that " ... fire and 
maneuver (together with protection- as found in an armored vehicle or by the dispensing of 
flares by an aircraft avoiding hostile missiles) are inseparable parts of a continuum."53 
Hughes says that maneuver warfare exists and is " ... the viable, practical, concept of 
operations for U.S. Navy and Marine forces in joint littoral warfare .... "54 However, he says 
that " ... maneuver warfare described as a unique style is a perverse product of the VietNam 
War"55 and that " ... maneuver zealots (the military reformers) haven't put Vietnam behind 
51Liddell Hart 219. 
52Atkeson 33. 
53 Atkeson 3 4. 
54Hughes. "Naval Maneuver Warfare." 1. 
55Hughes. "Naval Maneuver Warfare." 1. 
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them."56 He continues by stating that the generally accepted antithesis to maneuver, attrition, 
is a wrong comparison. He believes that mission accomplishment results from "domination" 
of the enemy. 
Domination comes from a combination of destruction, suppression, and 
demoralization. Attrition is only one method of domination. Destruction, suppression, and 
demoralization can be accomplished by attriting enemy forces. Hughes uses the phrase 
"power warfare" interchangeably with "domination." Power warfare, according to Hughes 
is the correct antithesis to maneuver. 57 However, he goes on to state, that even though the 
correct antithesis of maneuver is now developed, " ... each has its time and place, and pure 
forms are hard to find ... [and] ... each can increase our comparative advantage in combat and 
potential power."58 
Hughes's dichotomy only exists in theory to provide a comparison to maneuver and 
to correct what he considers a shortcoming in the theory of maneuver warfare. Practically, to 
Hughes, the dichotomy does not exist. There is no single good or smart style of fighting 
applicable to all cases in contrast to a universally bad or stupid style. Maneuver warfare or 
power warfare, which includes attrition as part of it, can both be correct depending upon the 
situation. 
56Hughes. "Naval Maneuver Warfare." 1. 
57Hughes. "Naval Maneuver Warfare." 2. 
58Hughes. "Naval Maneuver Warfare." 3. 
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Another view on styles of warfare is offered by Russell Weigley. Weigley drew on 
the German military historian Hans Delbtiick, who himself drew on the Prussian philosopher 
Clausewitz, to come up with the strategy of annihilation and the strategy of attrition . 
. . . There are two kinds of military strategy: the strategy of annihilation, 
which seeks the overthrow of the enemy's power and; and the strategy of 
attrition, exhaustion, or erosion, which is usually employed by a strategist 
whose means are not great enough to permit pursuit of the direct overthrow of 
the enemy and who therefore resorts to an indirect approach. 59 
Weigley's description is unique because it does not hold the indirect approach, 
commonly adopted by maneuver warfare theorists from Liddell Hart, and the strategy of 
attrition as mutually exclusive. He too, however, d~es not support a strict dichotomy of 
warfare. His example ofMacArthur in the Philippines demonstrates this point. 
General MacArthur said that when he met President Roosevelt at Pearl 
Harbor in July, 1944, he assured the President that losses in the reconquest of 
the Philippines would not be heavy: "The days of the frontal assault should be 
over. Modem infantry weapons are too deadly, and frontal assault is only for 
mediocre commander. Good commanders do not tum in heavy losses." But 
MacArthur had been able to avoid most frontal assaults in the past because the 
geography of the Southwest Pacific Area and the weapon of amphibious 
power afforded him the means to tum rather than storm strong enemy 
positions. In the Philippines, where land areas were relatively large and, 
unlike New Guinea, where he was determined to reconquer everything, his 
fighting had to come down to numerous frontal assaults and the casualties that 
went with them after all.60 
5~eigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 
Strategy and Policy. (Bloomington: Indiana State University Press, 1973) xxii. 
60Weigley 304-305. 
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In addition to questions about styles of warfare that arose with the US Navy's 
changing strategic focus, the Naval Doctrine Command Publication One addresses the issue 
of"levels" ofwar. It formally recognizes the operational level ofwar. This recognition is of 
fundamental importance to land warfare theories of maneuver warfare. The US Army 
recognized the operational level in its 1982 version ofFM 100-5. 
D. LEVELS OF WAR 
The United States military recognizes three levels of war: tactical, operational, and 
strategic. "The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between 
strategic objectives and tactical actions."61 
It is difficult to find a clear cut separation between the levels of war. This is 
especially true when a conflict is in progress: 
Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on 
their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical 
objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be 
determined during historical studies. "62 
The tactical level is " ... the planning level of war that deals with battles and 
engagements. "63 In official joint doctrine, it is " ... the employment of units in combat. "64 
Combat consists ofbattles and engagements. "An engagement is usually short in duration 
61
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." Joint Publication 3-0. (9 September 1993) 11-2. 
62
"Doctrine For joint Operations." 11-2. 
63Leonhard 9. 
64 
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." 11-4. 
21 
and fought between small forces65 Battles " ... consist of a set of engagements, ... typically last 
longer; involve larger forces ... and could effect the course of a campaign."66 
The operational level is " ... the planning level of war that constructs campaigns and 
major operations in order to accomplish theater goals articulated at the strategic planning 
levels; the intermediate planning level that integrates tactical efforts and events into a 
campaign."67 It " .. .links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives."68 
The strategic level is " ... the planning level of war that is responsible for applying 
military means to achieve national aim; the planning level that develops war plans and 
theater goals."69 In Joint Publication 3-0 it is " ... the art and science of developing and 
employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to 
secure national objectives."70 
Another vital question arising from Naval Doctrine Command's assignment of 
"preferred" status to maneuver warfare is at what level of war does maneuver warfare theory 
apply? Some authors believe the concept applies at all levels of war while others believe it 
applies only at the strategic or operational levels. It will be argued here that the proper level 
65
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." 11-4. 
66
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." 11-4. 
67Leonhard 8. 
68
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." 11-3. 
6~eonhard 7. 
70
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." II 2-3. 
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to consider maneuver warfare at sea is the operational level. There are two reasons: first, at 
the tactical level, the employment ofunits in combat, firepower plays a predominant role. 
Commanders attempt to sink ships and submarines, or destroy targets on land usually as part 
of a larger plan. At the tactical level, the measure of effectiveness is enemy units destroyed 
or disabled. Secondly, navies have always been maneuver elements at the strategic level. 
There is a more developed understanding of maneuver at the tactical and strategic levels of 
naval warfare. Maneuver warfare or elements of it can be shown to "apply" to the tactical 
level. It also can be shown to form the basis of the use of navies at the strategic level. 
However, the operational level, which links the other two levels, is where maneuver warfare, 
as a distinct style of organizing for and fighting wars, is most effectively applied. It also is 
where the US Navy has the least amount of understanding. 
In his classic Fleet Tactics, Hughes states: 
At sea the predominance of attrition over maneuver is a theme so basic 
that it runs throughout this book. Forces at sea are not broken by 
encirclement; they are broken by destruction. 71 
This theme indeed comes up repeatedly in his book. For example, 
Naval combat is a force-on-force process tending, in the threat or 
realization, toward the simultaneous attrition ofboth sides. To achieve 
victory one must attack effectively first. 72 · 
Hughes states that technology is responsible for the domination of firepower at the 
tactical level. "Maneuver in battle was once the classic definition oftactics ... but [now] it is 
71Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 27. 
72Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 147. 
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an orphan no longer warranting its earlier station."73 The range and speed of modern 
weapons makes tactical maneuver less important according to Hughes. "We know the 
situation today: with a potentially huge battlefield and fast-acting weapons, maneuver of 
even the most agile ships appears to be carried out at a snails pace. "74 This has led Hughes to 
the conclusion that " ... at sea the essence of tactical success has been the first application of 
offensive force. "75 
Rear Admiral Ya'ari, former Director oflsrael's Naval Intelligence, agrees with 
Hughes that the importance of tactical maneuver of surface ships at least, has been 
superseded by technology. He states that as late as the Second World War, 
" ... maneuverability of a fleet or a single ship ... was a crucial element in every battle."76 This 
changed, according to Ya'ari, with the adoption of the anti-ship missile by the world's 
navies: 
The surface ship is confronted now with a universal "smart" weapon, 
one that is so much faster and more agile than the ship - at least twenty or 
thirty times - that it is virtually unaffected by the ship's movements. The 
missile has practically annulled surface ship's maneuverability.77 
73Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 147. 
74Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 176. 
75Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 178. 
76Ya'ari, Yedida. "The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution." Naval War College Review 
XLVII, No.2. (Spring 1995). 10. 
nya'ari 10. 
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Hughes states that although technology has reduced the tactical importance of 
maneuver for navies, " ... the strategic influence of sea and land forces has always existed and 
has not changed much."78 Colin S. Gray's book The Leverage ofSeapower argues that 
navies are strategic maneuver forces. 
The mobility of sea power translates as an inherent agility that 
maritime command can exploit to achieve surprise. By their nature, naval 
forces are maneuver forces. Surprise at and from the sea is facilitated by the 
fact that naval forces are not canalized in their axis of threat as land forces are 
by natural and man-made obstacles. 79 
Hughes says that " ... mobility is the natural and normal advantage of a sea power over 
a land power."80 Probably the most convincing argument that sea power equals maneuver 
warfare at the strategic level comes from Liddell Hart in Strategy. He gives historical 
example after example ofthe use ofthe indirect approach made possible by sea power. His 
first case comes during the analysis of the wars of the ancient Greeks and Persians where he 
says: 
.. .It is worth note that the use of strategic mobility for indirect 
approach was realized and exploited much earlier in sea than in land warfare. 
The natural reason for this is that only in a late stage of development did 
armies come to depend on "lines of communication". Fleets, however, were 
78Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 141 
79Gray. The Leverage of Seapower. 263. 
80Hughes. "Naval Maneuver Warfare." 3. 
25 
used to operate against the seaborne communications, or means of supply, of 
opposing countries. 81 
He shows the continuation of this theme to modern times. The allied blockade of 
Germany in World War One was " ... a grand strategy of indirect approach to which no 
effective resistance was possible and of a type which incurred no risk except its slowness in 
effect."82 Even though the British Fleet appeared largely stationary and therefore did not 
conjure up images of "maneuver warfare" like the Blitzkrieg, the allies used the fleet to 
assault a critical weakness of Germany, namely its inability to simultaneously feed its 
citizens and armed forces. The allies used sea power to turn an exposed flank, according to 
Liddell Hart. His chapter on the Second World War includes numerous examples of the 
allied use of the indirect approach facilitated by amphibious capabilities coupled with local 
command of the sea. 
Leonhard states that " ... without a thorough understanding of the operational level of 
warfare, it is impossible to grasp the essence of maneuver warfare, because the greater part of 
maneuver warfare takes place at this level. "83 Although written with land maneuver warfare 
in mind, Leonhard's statement is suitable for maneuver warfare at sea. 
81Liddell Hart 31. 
82Liddell Hart 203-204. 
83Leonhard 8. 
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Joint Publication 3-0 states the focus of the operational level is the " ... operational art-
-the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, and 
execution of campaigns and major operations."84 It further states that the operational art: 
Helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before 
seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without the operational art, 
war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the 
only measure of success or failure. "85 
The operational level is the level at which maneuver warfare at sea needs to be studied and 
applied. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued that the United States Navy is in the midst of significant 
strategic and doctrinal innovation. It has discussed the competing views on styles of warfare 
and has argued that the examination of maneuver warfare at sea must naturally focus on the 
operational level. 
Maneuver warfare theory was developed by land warfare theorist and practitioners. 
A review of the literature is full of references to noted theorists of land warfare like 
Clausewitz and Guderian. FM 100-5 and FMFM 1 are often cited as well. The writings of 
naval warfare practitioners and theorists previously have begun to include these concepts 
84
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." 11-3. 
85
"Doctrine For Joint Operations." 11-3. 
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t__ ____________________________________________ _ 
with little or no discussion of their relevance to warfare at sea. The relevance of this practice 
is the main issue this thesis will attempt to address. 
Chapter II will examine the essential elements of maneuver warfare theory on land. 
These include the "Boyd Cycle," on which a definition of maneuver warfare will be based. A 
general definition of maneuver warfare at the operational level of land warfare will be 
developed. Next the definition and role of mission orders, the concept ofthe focus ofthe 
effort, and surfaces and gaps will be discussed as the main elements of maneuver warfare 
theory. Other factors, such as the role and purpose of firepower, counter attacks, the ratio of 
reserve to forward forces, and command and control systems and philosophy in land 
maneuver warfare theory will be analyzed. This chapter will also examine the development 
of maneuver warfare by the US Army and Marine Corps in order to determine why these 
organizations undertook this doctrinal route. 
Chapter III will use the framework developed in Chapter II to determine the 
relevance of land warfare concepts of maneuver warfare to naval warfare. This question is 
vital. Naval Doctrine Command has called maneuver warfare the preferred method of 
fighting. Doctrine reveals how the Navy thinks about the use of military force and those 
thoughts will determine what type forces are built, how they are trained, and how they are 
employed. Doctrine influences almost all aspects of the military: 
Simply put, military doctrine affects how one fights, trains, exercises, 
and plans, and organizes what one buys. Military doctrine influences some of 
the higher level concepts driving doctrine itself, and affects a number of 
subordinate concepts as well. Among them are tactics, techniques, 
procedures, rules of 
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engagement, training and education, organization and force structure, 
analysis, programming, campaign planning, strategy, and policy. 86 
Hughes says "Doctrine must be powerful: it must cause the Navy to fight better; 
generating ·powerful military action is the deepest, the teleological, purpose of doctrine. "87 
He does not like the view that doctrine is only guidance, " ... to unify belief and action, 
doctrine must proscribe and govern ... doctrine looses power to the extent that the response to 
it is optional. "88 
A view presently shared in all the services is that doctrine is at once 
authoritative and merely guidance; doctrine is thus characterized in armed 
forces publications. In July 1994, however, the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs 
of staff disconcerted the "guidance" school with these forceful words which 
are to appear hence in joint publications: The guidance in the publication is 
authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine except when 
exceptional circumstances prove otherwise. 89 
Hughes concludes it is vital to ensure the US Navy has correct doctrine " ... soundly 
conceived , clearly expressed, widely popular, firmly grasped, and shrewdly interpreted .... "90 
86Tritten. "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine." 31. 
87Hughes, Wayne P. "The Power in Doctrine." Naval War College Review XL VIII, no 
3. (Spring 1995). 7. 
88Hughes "The Power in Doctrine." 10. 
89Hughes. "The Power in Doctrine." 27-28. 
90Hughes. "The Power in Doctrine." 28. 
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This thesis will examine if the doctrine of naval maneuver warfare is based on sound 
principles. 
The final chapter will examine the implications of Chapter III for the US Navy, 
especially in relation to joint warfare. Paul Bracken developed the concept of the next 
military to describe a military of the next ten years, using much of the same equipment and 
reacting to the current security environment. He contrasted this with the concept the military 
after the next which takes into account new security situations and technologies.91 His article 
is a good framework to judge if the US Navy's interest in maneuver warfare, providing it 
proves relevant to naval warfare, has any long term usefulness. 
91Bracken, Paul. "The Military After the Next." Washington Quarterly. 16 noS. 
(Autumn 1993) 157. 
30 
II. THE MANEUVER WARFARE CONCEPT AND LAND WARFARE 
A. INTRODUCTION: US ARMY AND MARINE CORPS FOLLOW 
MANEUVER WARFARE CONCEPTS 
The United States ground combat forces have incorporated the concept of maneuver 
warfare as part oftheir doctrine. The US Marine Corps has done so explicitly in FMFM-1 
Warfighting. Daniel Bolger insists, " ... present Army doctrine is not maneuver warfare [and] 
maneuver warfare is not a developed doctrine nor a refined method ofwarfare."92 Bolger is 
incorrect. While the existence of and usefulness of maneuver warfare as a separate form of 
warfare is still debated by some land warfare theorists and practitioners, it is a developed 
doctrine used by the Marine Corps and it is a sufficiently refined method of warfare for it to 
have become the cornerstone of US Army doctrine. 
Determining if the Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as doctrine is easy. 
Former Commandant General Gray assigns the importance ofFMFM-1 Warfighting to the 
Marine Corps in his foreword to that document: 
I expect every officer to read and reread this book, understand it, and 
take its message to heart. The thoughts contained here represent not just 
guidance for action, but a way of thinking in general. This manual describes a 
philosophy for action which, in war and in peace, in the field and the rear, 
dictates our approach to duty. 93 
92Bolger, Daniel P. "Maneuver Warfare: Flying High On Gossamer Wings." Army. 
(September 1986) 24. 
93Warfighting: FMFM-1. (Washington, DC: Department ofthe Navy, Headquarter 
United States· Marine Corps, 6 March 1989). foreword. 
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Warfighting specifically states that the basis for the Marine Corps' doctrine is the 
theory that: 
Just as there are two basic forms of combat [offense and defense], 
there are two essential components: fire and maneuver. Of all the countless 
activities in combat we can distill them to these. 94 
It goes on to say that " ... the warfighting doctrine which we derive from our theory is one 
based on maneuver [and that] requirement[s] mandate a doctrine of maneuver warfare."95 
Determining the extent of the US Army's official acceptance of the doctrine of 
maneuver warfare is a little more difficult because of its concept of"balance" and the use of 
the word "maneuver" in several different ways in FM 100-5. FM 100-5 is " ... the Army's 
keystone warfighting doctrine ... guid[ing] Army commanders [and] describ[ing] how to think 
about campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, and operations other than war."96 
The US Army views doctrine as " ... the authoritative guide to how the Army forces fight wars 
and conduct operations other than war."97 
The Army does not explicitly accept or reject.the concept of maneuver warfare. It 
ostensibly advocates a concept of balance: 
94Warfighting. 27. 
95Warfighting. 37. 
960perations: FM 100-5. (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, 14 
June 1993) iv. 
97 Operations. v. 
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The components of battle can be joined in a limitless array of complex 
combinations. Often, elements of a defense are within every offense; within 
every defense , an offense. Army forces maneuver to bring firepower on the 
enemy, and bring firepower on the enemy in order to maneuver. Army forces 
tend to focus on the enemy, but will use terrain for positional advantage when 
warranted ... Balance and a rich choice of options are key to success ... Army 
forces seek to increase their options while limiting those of their opponents ... 
While maintaining his balance, the commander does everything in his power 
to throw the enemy offbalance.98 · 
The Army says it believes in balance; however, its understanding of the essential 
elements of maneuver warfare are almost exactly the same as the Marine Corps' and of the 
maneuver "zealots." Throwing the enemy "offbalance," for example, is an allusion to 
Lind's judo analogy. However, another reason why it can be argued that the US Army has 
not adopted a doctrine of maneuver warfare is because the word maneuver is used in a 
number of different respects. 
Maneuver, in FM 100-5, is used as a principle of war, a primary element of combat 
power, a combat function, a type of unit (as in ".maneuver forces"), and a form of movement. 
These forms of movement include envelopment, turning, infiltration, penetration, and frontal 
attack. The issue of the US Army's adoption of maneuver warfare as doctrine is also 
confused by the description of maneuver in the different circumstances addressed. For 
instance, maneuver as a principle ofwar is defined as placing " ... the enemy in a position of 




confusing because it is based on the definition of combat power which itself is defined as a 
combination of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Maneuver is defined by 
combat power and combat power is defined by maneuver. Furthermore, the level of analysis 
is confused. In the same explanation, maneuver is defined simply as tactical movement of 
units on the battlefield, " ... movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage," and in 
the maneuver warfare theory paradigm as " ... continually pos[ing] new problems for the 
enemy, rendering his actions ineffective, and eventually leading to his defeat."100 The last 
part of the definition will be shown to actually paraphrase the definition of the modem 
concept of maneuver warfare. 
This chapter will examine maneuver warfare as it is understood by the US military 
ground combat forces, and will describe its essential elements. FM 1 00-S's views on these 
elements will be compared with the views of the maneuver warfare theorists. This will 
demonstrate that maneuver warfare is not only a developed doctrine, but also that the US 
Army has adopted it along with the Marine Corps . After the concept is defined, the chapter 
will conclude with a look at maneuver warfare in history concentrating on why nations chose 
or were compelled to choose maneuver warfare as a doctrine. Finally, it will show why the 
United States ground forces adopted maneuver warfare as doctrine. This chapter will serve 
as a framework to analyze to what extent maneuver warfare on land is relevant to maneuver 
warfare at sea. 
1000perations 2-10. 
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B. MANEUVER WARFARE DEFINED 
Martin Van Creveld believes that " ... as a style ofwarfare, maneuver is as old as war 
itsel£"101 This is true, but the modem intellectual basis for the concept's adoption by the US 
Marine Corps and Army come predominantly from William Lind and the "military 
reformers" of the nineteen seventies. The latter were an informal group of academics, 
military officers, and congressmen known as the "military reformers." The military 
reformers were not an organized group or coalition. Leaderless, they had no common theme 
other than to increase the professionalism and effectiveness of the US military. 
Lind's involvement in national defense issues began in 1973 with his service as 
legislative assistant to US Senator Taft. He eventually became Taft's military advisor. Prior 
to joining US Senator Hart's staff in 1977, he drafted Taft's white paper "A Modem Military 
Strategy For The United States." This paper was published in 1978 and criticized the US 
Army's "Active defense" for being overly attrition based. He co-authored Hart's 1986 book, 
America Can Win. 102 
His theory is based largely on Liddell Hart's theory ofthe indirect approach, 
combined with John Boyd's theory of combat commander decision making. From Liddell 
Hart, maneuver warfare theorists adopted the concept that defeat results from non-material · . 
101 Creveld, Martin Van, Canby, Steven L., and Brower, Kenneth S. Airpower and 
Maneuver Warfare. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, July 
1994) 1. 
102Hart, Gary and Lind, WilliamS. America Can Win. (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler 
Publishers Inc, 1986) ix-xi. 
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causes. The enemy is defeated when he, especially the enemy commander, believes he 
cannot win. 
John Boyd, a retired US Air Force colonel, offered his unpublished theory of combat 
decision making by way of a five hour lecture titled "Patterns Of Conflict." Congressman 
Newt Gingrich called Boyd's theory " ... a substantial portion of the original military theory 
developed in this century." 103 Boyd, observing air combat in the Korean War, where US 
airmen were ten times as successful as their enemy, developed a theory on how this was 
accomplished. F-86 pilots in Korea had the advantage of superior mobility, due to their 
aircraft's advanced hydraulic controls, and better visibility. Enemy planes were superior in 
all other regards, such as climb rate, acceleration rate, and sustained tum rate. "Although the 
MiG could perform many individual actions ... better than the F-86's, the F-86 could 
transition from one action to another more quickly than the MiG."104 
American pilots developed tactics which capitalized on their aircraft's advantages: 
The American pilots ... forced the MiG into a series of actions. Each 
time the action changed, the F-86 gained a time advantage, because the F-86 
could see more quickly how the situation had changed, and he could make his 
aircraft shift more quickly into a new maneuver. With each shift, the MiG's 
action became more inappropriate until they were so inappropriate that the 
MiG gave the F-86 a good firing opportunity. Often it appeared that the MiG 
pilot realized what was happening to him and panicked which made the 





The experience led Boyd to believe that conflict was a " ... time-competitive 
observation- orientation- decision- action cycle."106 In combat, a commander observes the 
enemy and his surroundings, orients himself and develops an understanding of the situation. 
He then makes a decision as to what course of action to take, and takes that action. This has 
been called the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA loop" (observation-orientation-decision-action 
loop). The enemy commander engages in the same process. 
If one side can consistently go through the Boyd Cycle faster than the 
other, it gains a tremendous advantage. By the time the slower side acts, the 
faster side is doing something different from what it observed, and the action 
of the slower side is inappropriate. With each cycle, the slower party's action 
is inappropriate by a larger time margin. Even though it desperately strives to 
do something that will work, each action is less useful than its predecessor, 
the slower side falls farther and farther behind. Ultimately - and often 
suddenly - it ceases to function effectively. Frequently, it panics. 107 
Lind saw the application Boyd's theory as the means to achieve Liddell Hart's goal of 
victory through the indirect approach. Lind says: 
The Boyd Theory defines what is meant by the term "maneuver" in 
"maneuver warfare". Maneuver means Boyd cycling the enemy, being 
consistently faster through however many OODA loops it takes until the 
enemy loses his cohesion -- until he can no longer fight as an effective, 
organized force. 108 
106Lind 6. 
1 07Hart 6-7. 
108Lind 6. 
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The US Army, in one of its uses ofthe word "maneuver" in FM 100-5, describes it 
as " ... the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage."109 This 
description of maneuver as movement is not what advocates like Lind mean by maneuver 
warfare. However, the paragraph continues with a description of effective maneuver: 
Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the 
force, it is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to 
reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by 
rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat. 110 
The last sentence paraphrases Lind's' OODA loop based definition of maneuver 
warfare. It captures the essence of the goal of maneuver warfare. The Army's view on the 
importance and the role of the operational level is also in accordance with the tenets of 
maneuver warfare theory. 
Lind calls the operational level of war "operational art" and says it fits between 
strategy and tactics. Successful maneuver warfare depends on understanding and 
successfully exploiting the operational level of war according to Lind and Leonhard. 
Maneuver warfare theory holds that the commander's role at the operational level is to 
decide to accept or to refuse battle. Battle is a tool, not the goal of a maneuver campaign. 
Leonhard sees this as a defining difference between maneuver and attrition warfare. If a 




on favorable terms. If not, it should be avoided. 111 Leonhard says that battle is a " ... building 
block, not an end in itself..." and won, lost, and avoided battles are used by a commander 
skilled in maneuver warfare to win a campaign. 112 
However, Lind and Leonhard are not completely correct. Battle is also the tool of an 
attrition campaign. It is how the attrition-oriented commander physically destroys his 
opponent. For attrition theory to be effective, battle must also be brought about under 
favorable conditions. The difference is that battle is the only operational goal and the only 
tool of the attrition warfare adherent. Battle is necessary in the "operational art" of maneuver 
warfare, but it is not the only option as it is for attrition warfare at the operational level. 
The US Army's description ofthe operational level adheres to this theory and implies 
that maneuver is a distinct form ofwarfare: 
At the operational level, maneuver is the means by which the 
commander determines where and when to fight by setting the terms ofbattle, 
declining battle, or acting to take advantage of tactical actions. Maneuver is 
dynamic warfare that rejects predictable patterns of operations. 113[my 
emphasis] 
The modem concept of maneuver warfare, as understood and adopted by the US 
Marine Corps and Army, is based on the OODA loop and the belief that victory comes 
predominantly from non-material causes and that one must dominate the operational level of 
war. This concept has several essential elements. All of these elements exist in all forms of 




warfare. However, their importance or purpose in maneuver warfare are defining factors for 
the concept. These essential elements will be described in detail to aid in the analysis of the 
US Navy's concept. 
C. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MODERN MANEUVER WARFARE THEORY 
The essential elements in modem maneuver warfare fall into two broad categories. 
The first is command and control, and the second pertains to the views and applications of 
the battlefield and combat power. The style of command and control for maneuver warfare is 
unique and vital to the concept. The key aspect of maneuver warfare is the concept of the 
commander's intent. Every other aspect of maneuver warfare is based on and is linked to the 
commander's intent. The commander's intent is the end state he wishes to achieve. It must 
be understood by subordinate commanders. The other aspect of maneuver warfare 
command and control is the focus of the effort. Surfaces and gaps, enemy strengths and 
weaknesses, describe how a commander views the battlefield. The aspects of combat power 
essential to maneuver warfare as a concept are firepower, combined arms, fire support, 
counter attacks, the ratio of reserve to forward forces, and views of combat intangibles. 
1. Command and Control 
The command and control system of maneuver warfare is designed to provide a 
commander with the means to dominate the Boyd Cycle. Its main principle is mission orders 
based on the commander's intent. " Mission orders" developed from the German concept of 
"Auftragstaktik," demonstrate the attention paid to the warfighting style of the German Army 
in the Second World War by much of the literature on maneuver warfare. Auftragstaktik was 
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seen as a solution by the Germans to the problem of battlefield dispersion caused by modern 
weapons. In addition, competent leaders capable of making and carrying out a decision 
quickly was also seen as a way of dealing with "friction."114 . 
Mission type orders are key to the decentralization necessary for a 
rapid Boyd Cycle. A mission type order tells the subordinate what his 
superior wants to have accomplished. That is the mission. It leaves how to 
accomplish it largely up to the subordinate. As the subordinate's situation 
changes, he does what he thinks is necessary to bring about what the result his 
superior wants. He informs his superior what he has done, but does not wait 
for permission before he acts. What would happen to his Boyd Cycle if he 
did?115 
The concept is different from telling a subordinate what to do and not how to do it. It 
is not simply telling a subordinate to "take that hill" and letting him decide the tactics. The 
commander's intent tells a subordinate why he has been assigned a particular role. The 
intent, or the end result the commander wants to achieve, is the why. If a subordinate 
commander can fulfill his role in the action by a method that is radically different than what 
his superior envisioned, he is free to do so. This freedom of choice is vital to the concept of 
maneuver warfare. Subordinate commanders must be able to rapidly exploit weaknesses the 
appear during the course of the action. The Marine Corps not only believes that ~ssion 
orders allow freedom of action but also " ... establish[ es] the duty - to take whatever steps [the 
114Nelson III, John T. "Auftragstaktik: A Case For Decentralized Battle." Parameters 
XVIII, no: 3. (September 1987). 21-34. 
115Lind 13. 
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subordinate commander] deems necessary based on the situation."116 The commander's 
intent, which does not change as easily as a task does with a changing situation, is what 
cements the subordinate actions to the goal and preserves unity of effort. 117 
This philosophy requires a command and control system that is made up of capable 
and trusted subordinates who are thoroughly familiar with the purpose of operations they are 
undertaking. Simpkin says " .. .let us be absolutely clear what we are talking about, a chain 
of trust and mutual respect running unbroken [from the highest to the lowest level of 
command]."118 Commanders must have trust in their subordinates' ability, but must also 
have a way to monitor or observe their subordinates. "The first [requirement] of freedom of 
action," according to Simpkin, " .. .is immediate and full reporting."119 
Chapter VI ofFM 100-5, "Planning and Executing Operations", describes mission 
orders as those orders based on the commander's intent " ... which specify what the 
subordinate commands are to do without prescribing how they must do it..."120 and says the 
following about the commander's intent: 
The commander's intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise 
expression ofthe purpose ofthe operation and must be understood two 
116Warfighting. 70. 
117Warfighting. 71. 
118Simpkin, Richard E. Race To The Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. 




echelons below the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of 
the mission. It is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements. 
It is not a summary of the concept ofthe operation. Its purpose is to 
focus subordinates on the desired end state. Its utility is to focus subordinates 
on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success, even when the 
plan and the concept of operations no longer apply, and to discipline their 
efforts to that end. 121 
2. The Focus of the Effort 
The second essential element of modem maneuver warfare theory is the focus ofthe 
effort ofthe operation. It is based on the concept of the commander's intent. It is the way 
the commander believes the desired end state will be achieved. "In effect, [the commander 
has] decided: this is how I will achieve a decision; everything else is secondary." 122 This is 
different than the concept of a center of gravity. The center of gravity was originally 
described by Clausewitz·who defined it as being: 
... always found where the mass is concentrated more densely. It 
presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is 
that struck by the center of gravity. 123 
The maneuver warfare adherents believe that Clausewitz holds the center of gravity 
always as the center of mass ofthe army. They do not support this view. For them, the 
center of gravity is the critical vulnerability of the enemy. "Destruction or neutralization of 
1210perations 6-6. 
122Warfighting 73. 
123Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter, ed and trans. 
(Princeton New Jersey: The Princeton University Press, 1984) 485-486. 
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[the enemy's] center of gravity must not merely result in reduction of his capabilities, but 
rather in the paralysis of his forces." 124 The US Marine Corps does not even use the phrase 
"center of gravity" and considers it a dangerous concept. It .describes its reasoning in a 
footnote: 
[The center of gravity] is consistent with Clausewitz' historical 
perspective. But we have come to prefer pitting strength against weakness. 
Applying the term to modem warfare we must make it clear that by the 
enemy's center of gravity we do not mean a source of strength, but rather a 
critical vulnerability. 125 
The US Army says that the center of gravity is the " ... hub of all power and movement 
upon which everything depends." 126 This implies that the army views center of gravity in the 
classical sense of a source of strength. However, it continues its description in terms that 
mean critical vulnerability: 
It is that characteristic, capability, or location upon which from which 
enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or 
will to fight. 
For example, the center of gravity might concern the mass of enemy 
units, but that mass might not yet be formed. Additionally, the center of 
gravity may be abstract, such as the enemy's national will or alliance 
structure, or concrete, such as strategic reserves, C2, or industrial bases and 




127 Operations 6-7. 
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The focus of the effort may attack the enemy's center of gravity but the two are 
different and non-interchangeable concepts. The focus of the effort is the primary entity 
involved in an action to achieve the commanders intent. 
When a unit is designated the focus of effort, all other units work to 
support it. It gets the artillery, air, and so on. The reserve is positioned to be 
able to exploit its success. Its neighbors as themselves, "What can I do to 
support the [focus of effort]" ... not just the main attack (though the main 
attack is often at the [focus of effort]). It is a conceptual focus not a physical 
one.I2& 
The US Army uses the term point of effort, which Lind says can be dangerous, but it 
description is the same as the US Marine Corp's description. A "point of effort" helps 
commanders and their staffs " ... allocate resources accordingly, providing focus to the 
operation while setting priorities and determining risks, promoting unity of effort, and 
facilitating an understanding ofthe commander's intent."129 
3. Surfaces and Gaps 
Surfaces and gaps describe the way a battlefield is divided in a maneuver 
commander's mind. They represent the strengths and weaknesses ofthe enemy and take into 
account the terrain. Lind says he does not call them strengths and weaknesses because 
strengths and weaknesses appear as solid surfaces or gaps to ground commanders. This 




because it helps determine the focus. Ideally, the focus of effort should be directed towards 
the enemy critical vulnerability through an enemy gap not against an enemy surface.130 The 
US Marine Corps does recognize the possibility that a gap may not be present: 
Whenever possible, we exploit existing gaps. Failing that, we create gaps. 131 
The concept of surfaces and gaps requires the concept of the "reconnaissance pull" to 
replace the concept of"command push." The command push reconnaissance system is 
characterized by the commander determining the axis of advance or attack first and then 
sending out reconnaissance forces on that axis. The main body then follows. In maneuver 
warfare theory, reconnaissance should pull the focus of effort through gaps. The commander 
sends out reconnaissance first. Gaps are determined and then the commander designates the 
focus of effort. 132 Generally, a larger proportion of forces are used in the reconnaissance role 
in a maneuver-based army than in an attrition-based one. 
The US Army does not explicitly call for a "reconnaissance pull" like the US Marine 
Corps, but it's description of a successful attack describes this concept even as it borrows the 
"expanding torrent" description of an attack first made by Liddell Hart in Strategy. 
The ideal attack might resemble a torrent of water rushing forward and 
expanding it channels around major resistance. It should move fast, follow 





and shift its strength quickly to widen penetrations and reinforce its successes, 
thereby carrying the battle deep into the enemy's rear. 133 
4. The Role of Firepower, Combined Arms Concept, and Fire Support 
Many critics of maneuver warfare theory say that it minimizes the element of 
firepower. To them the maneuver warfare supporters fall into the fallacy that Clausewitz 
warned of in his chapter discussing "the maximum use of force." "Kind hearted people 
might of course think there is some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too 
much bloodshed, and might imagine that it is the true goal of the art ofwar."134 
This is easily exaggerated. None of the literature on maneuver warfare claims that 
firepower is not important or that movement of forces alone is sufficient to bring about 
victory. However, the maneuver theorists agree with the last sentence of Clausewitz' 
explanation of the maximum use of force which states: "The maximum use of force is in no 
way incompatible with he simultaneous use of the intellect." 135 Firepower is a critical 
element of maneuver warfare; however, the role and purpose offirepower is different. 
There is no debate over whether units fire in order to move or move in order to fire, 
they do both according to the situation. The purpose of firepower in maneuver is to aid in 






combined arms approach to fire support, which multiplies the effectiveness offirepower, 
serves this purpose. 
Combined arms hits the enemy with two or more arms simultaneously 
in such a manner that the actions he must take to defend himself from one 
make him more vulnerable to another ... Combined arms, like other elements of 
maneuverwarfare, seek to strike at the enemy psychologically as well as 
physically. 137 
The US Army's concept of firepower and combined arms and fire support is also 
based on modern maneuver warfare concepts. The goal is to: 
... confuse, demoralize, and destroy the enemy with the coordinated 
impact of combat power. The enemy cannot comprehend what is 
happening; the enemy commander cannot communicate his intent nor can he 
coordinate his actions. The sudden and devastating impact ofcombined 
arms paralyzes the enemy's response, leaving him ripe for defeat. 138 
5. Counter Attacks and the Reserve 
Modern maneuver warfare does not ignore the defensive. Maneuver theorists do not 
hold the unreasonable view that they will always be able to be on the offensive strategically 
or operationally. However, they look on enemy attacks as potentially exploitable 
opportunities. Attacks concentrate the enemy's strength towards his front, presenting a 
strong surface and creating the potential for a gap at his rear or flanks. The best way to 




strong reserve against the gaps in the enemy flank or rear once he is committed to the attack. 
This is preferable to meeting the attack head on. 139 
In addition to the strength required in the defensive and counter attacking role, using 
the reconnaissance pull approach also requires a strong reserve. Gaps are often fleeting and a 
commander must have forces ready to " ... widen the gap and create local success."140 The 
reserve is not a small force to reinforce the main body should it get into trouble. It is a means 
to achieve decision. It is used to exploit successes rather than prevent failures. 
theory. 
The US Army's doctrine for employment of the reserve is based on maneuver warfare 
The employment of the reserves may be the most crucial decision 
commanders make. As the battle is joined, operational-level commanders 
adjust the final maneuver of their forces and look for opportunities to defeat 
the enemy's defense in depth. In particular, they seek ways to employ their 
operational reserves decisively. In battle, commanders position operational 
reserves where they can best exploit tactical success. 141 
6. Intangibles 
The role of intangibles was first mentioned at the end offirst chapter's brief 
description of maneuver and attrition. The view ofthe attrition warfare school of intangibles 
in warfare is that they are of minor importance. If useful at all they are simply a force 





same intangibles, like will, courage, cohesion, and morale are the most important 
component. Destruction of these intangibles ultimately creates victory. The Army's FM 
100-5 accepts this view, almost to a dangerous extreme. An example is its lengthy 
discussion ofthe role and importance of "will." 
Will is the disposition to act toward achievement of a desired end 
state. It is an expression of determination, the articulation of choice and 
desire. A platoon takes the hill because it wants to take the hill. The squad 
defends its position because it wants to defend its position. 
War is a contest of wills. Combat power is product of military forces 
and the will to fight. When will is lacking, so is combat power; when will is 
strong, it multiplies the effectiveness of the military forces. 
Ultimately, the focus of all combat operations must be the enemy's 
will. 
Break his-will and he is defeated. ~en he no longer wants to fight, 
he cannot fight. Conversely, if his will remains strong, even though he is 
physically weakened and materially depleted, he remains a formidable 
opponent. 
Leaders are the main source of will. They inspire their soldiers with 
the desire to win, to accomplish the mission, and to persevere in the face of all 
difficulties. When the will of the enemy commander is broken, his force 
quickly disintegrates. Analyzing and attacking the underpinnings of his will 
therefore is the key to victory. 142 
Maneuver warfare is a distinct style of thinking about, organizing for, and fighting 
wars. Like attrition or revolutionary warfare it represents one view of the continuum that is 
"war." Its distinctness is derived from the way its adherents view and apply aspects common 
to all types of warfare. The US Army and Marine Corps have adopted this style of war 
1420perations 6-7. 
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fighting as doctrine. It is a change from the traditional attrition based doctrines and concepts 
of operations of those organizations. 
D. WHY THE US ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ADOPTED THE MODERN 
CONCEPT OF MANEUVER WARFARE. 
1. Maneuver Warfare As A Historical Choice 
Maneuver warfare, like all political and military choices, is one that is made by policy 
makers constrained by political, economic, and social factors. This is true of the period of 
wars in the 18th century which was marked by warfare where maneuver, rather than battle, 
often was decisive on its own, and a commander's reputation was based his success in 
decisive maneuvering. 
The eighteenth century system ofwar, wrote Marshal Foch, "tried to 
achieve their objectives by stratagems, threat, negotiation, maneuver, partial 
actions, occupation of hostile territory, and the capture of fortified places." 
The marshal accepted the oft-held view that war in the age ofReason was 
limited because its exponents wished it to be so, that generals earned their 
reputations by ponderously moving their armies round the low countries 
deliberately avoiding battle. 143 
Strachan believes that social, economic, and political reasons limited the objectives of 
warfare and caused a focus on maneuver. European powers did not want to repeat the 
destruction of the Thirty Year's War. Industry was just beginning in many countries and 
needed protection. Each additional soldier for the army was one removed from agriculture 
or industry. This affected militaries in two ways. Less people involved in production would 
143Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct ofWar. (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1983) 8. 
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limit supplies. Also, very importantly, smaller numbers of people involved in production 
would limit tax revenues collected by the monarch further limiting the size of the forces he 
could field. 144 
The social and political order was ruled by monarchs. Preservation of this order was 
more important than decisive defeat of enemy nations. This had the effect oflimiting the 
size of armies and the goals of conflicts. Monarchs attempted to limit the expense of wars 
because they did not want to bargain away their power for increased tax revenues from 
developing parliaments. Also limiting decisiveness was the social composition of the army. 
Its officers were of the noble class while its soldiers were of the lowest classes. The soldiers 
deserted often, making reconnaissance and more dispersed tactics impossible. 145 
Other uncontrollable conditions limited the decisiveness of battle. Communication 
was poor. This led to massing of forces on traversable roads. Movement was slow and 
supplies from the surrounding areas were quickly used up. This necessitated longer supply 
trains which, in turn, slowed down the army further and diverted troops from battle to protect 
the supply train. Communication was not only poor, but good communication was known by 
the enemy. Advances were naturally canalized and a nation could set up fortifications in 
peacetime on avenues of approach. These fortifications could be well stocked with food and 
ammunition. Attackers were at a disadvantage because the longer the siege lasted, the less 




The defensive was much stronger than the offensive.146 Strachan concludes that "War was in 
consequence limited by its means, but this was in spite of its practitioners, not because of 
them."147 
Like limited warfare in the Age ofReason, the adoption of maneuver warfare as a 
doctrine or concept of operations in recent times is a reflection of choices made under 
constraints. There are three main reasons why nations embraced maneuver warfare in the 
twentieth century. They are a means to professionalize the army; an attempt to compensate 
for the quantitative superiority of an opponent by providing quick, decisive, and relatively 
inexpensive operational victories; and an attempt to overcome the inherent superiority of the 
defense. 
The German Army, which is considered the model of a maneuver warfare force by 
the US Army and Marines, provides a good example of all three reasons. Contrary to the 
opinion that the Germans only adopted maneuver warfare after the First World War with the 
development ofBlitzkrieg, they adopted it in the late 19th century. The Schlieffen Plan is an 
example. Geyer says that the Prussian, and later German General Staff, was concerned that 
the "nation in arms" seen during the Napoleonic Wars would mean the loss of control ofthe 
professional military class over the armed forces. 
Schlieffen seemed to have found the perfect solution for a 




decision oriented warfare, the Cannae principle of envelopment - served only 
one superior rationale: to preserve war as a professional domain. 148 
Other scholars disagree that the Cannae principle of envelopment served only one 
superior rationale. They believe the German choice of maneuver warfare was an example of 
the second reason. The Germans saw the choice of maneuver warfare as the solution to its 
problem of encirclement by more powerful adversaries. Posen argues that "Germany was 
military weak and surrounded by strong neighbors .... " 149 Although other nations surrounded 
by strong neighbors developed different solutions to the problem, for Germany this led to an 
offensive mind set beginning with Frederick the Great. 
Since the reign of Frederick the Great, the Prussian and later German 
Officer Corps had dedicated themselves to a particular style of warfare. The 
famous German General Staff stressed mobility above all else. It strove for 
flank attacks, envelopments, and encirclement battles of 
annihilation ... Systematic causes, both political and geographic, played an 
important role in the evolution of this doctrine. Germany faced enemies on 
several fronts whose total military power exceeded her own ... Historians agree 
that a primary determinant of the character of German Doctrine was the two-
front war problem. 150 
Thirdly, maneuver warfare is an attempt to counter the inherent superiority of the 
defense on land and make land warfare decisive. The superiority of defense on land has long 
been regarded as true by soldiers and theorists. Clausewitz states that "The defensive form of 
148Geyer, Michael. "German Strategy in the Age ofMachine Warfare, 1914-1945." 
Makers ofModern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Paret, Petered. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) 531. 
149posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France. Britain. and Germany 
Between the World Wars. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,1984) 180. 
150Posen 183. 
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been regarded as true by soldiers and theorists. Clausewitz states that "The defensive form of 
warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive [emphasis in original]."151 He believes 
this is due primarily to the defender's advantage of position. However, he adds that the 
defensive form of warfare is stronger but has a "negative object."152 "Defense has a passive 
purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest [emphasis in original]."153 The 
belief that the defensive was the stronger form of warfare but the offensive was decisive, was 
reinforced after the failure of the Schlieffen Plan led to trench warfare in World War One on 
the Western Front. Maneuver warfare was seen by many theorists as a way to reintroduce 
decision in land warfare. For example, Simpkin calls Blitzkrieg a " ... pragmatic managerial 
response to an extremely difficult situation" of returning " ... mobility and offensive capability 
to the infantry" under Treaty of Versailles constraints. 154 The quest to bring decision back to 
land warfare was not unique to Germany. "A major theme in Liddell Hart's publications on 
this issue," writes Bond and Martin, " .. .is that the defensive is markedly superior to the attack 
in modem land warfare and that weapons development actually increases this superiority."155 
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warfare theorists] sought to restore mobility, minimize casualties, and secure a speedy 
victory by means of a small, elite, professional mechanized armies."156 
2. The US Army and Marine Corps Adopt the Concept of Maneuver 
Warfare 
The US Army and Marine Corps adopted the concept of maneuver warfare in early 
1980's. The reasons those organizations did was primarily for the second historical reason. 
They expected to be vastly outnumbered if war came with the Soviet Union. The second 
reason was to increase the professionalism of the US Army and reduce the negative effects of 
its involvement in the Vietnam War. 
The doctrine ofthe US Army in the early late 1970's and early 1980's was a function 
of political, economic, and social factors. Politically, the US Army had to be based forward 
on the inter-German border. It was not feasible to have a doctrine that supported anything 
else than defending all of West German territory. Secondly, the war in Vietnam had a 
tremendous political and social effect on the United States and its military forces. 
The war in Vietnam, of course, has been the single most important 
cause ofturbulence and uncertainty for the Army ofthe 1970's and 1980's. 
The war in Vietnam was the American Army's least successful war. Not only 
did the outcome cast into doubt the whole post-1950's rationale for the Army; 
the manner in which the war was fought also generated profound misgivings 
within the service as well as among the American people at large about the 
possible erosion ofthe Army's tactical, operational, and strategic skills. 
Moreover, the outcome raised questions about the Army's continued loyalty 
156Bond and Alexander 623. 
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to those national democratic values with which the military's relationship has 
been one oftension at best. 157 
The Army's doctrine ofthe time was influenced by what Bradford and Brown call the 
Vietnam legacy," ... a circumscribed role for ground forces" 158 and qudget constraints from a 
planned post-Vietnam peace dividend. 159 It was also based on the US Army's Training and 
Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) interpretations ofthe lessons ofthe 1973 Arab-Israeli War. 
Leonhard says the main tenets of Active Defense were that all war is tactical, the first battle 
is vital and the US Army must win it, and forces must be technically and tactically 
proficient. 160 The 197 6 edition of FM 100-5 detailed this doctrine and, according to Weigley, 
was a departure from the American way of war. 
The manual departed from the American Army's traditional preference 
for the offensive as the decisive form of war to give a new emphasis on the 
virtue of the defensive, to the extent that some readers interpreted it as 
asserting the superiority of the defensive in war. Without actually going that 
far, the manual suggested that an active defense could exploit the lethality of 
modem weaponry to destroy a major portion of the enemy's armed forces 
before the transition to an American offensive should occur. 161 
157Weigley, Russell F. Histozy of the United States Army. (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1984) 558. 
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In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Active Defense came under attack from various 
sources, especially the "military reformers" and even from TRADOC. In 1977, General Don 
Starry head of TRADOC said that 
... even factoring in the latest technology and equipment the West could 
offer, the force ratios and anticipated loss rates in the Central Battle would 
eventually produce a Warsaw Pact victory. 162 
In 1986, the US military ground forces (including three marine divisions) 
consisted of20 divisions, 11,053 tanks, 3,491 artillery pieces, 9,785 armored personnel 
carriers, and 5,345 helicopters. The Soviet Union had 193 divisions, 51,000 tanks, 
34,000 artillery pieces, and 70,000 armored personnel carriers. The United States was 
superior to them in the number of helicopters. The People's Republic of China had 158 
divisions, 11,450 tanks, and 12,800 artillery pieces. The United States was superior to 
them in numbers of armored personnel carriers and helicopters. 163 Although these 
numbers are "rough" and say nothing about quality of equipment and troops, they 
demonstrate that the United States was vastly outnumbered. Hart and Lind saw the force 
ratio problem as insurmountable without adopting maneuver warfare. 
The solution to the numbers problem on the Central European Front was seen as 
blunting the first attack and attacking the follow on forces to prevent a decisive break 
162Leonhard 13 6. 
163Hart 29. 
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through. 164 This eventually became the Airland Battle Doctrine which is based on 
maneuver warfare. Weigley writes that this became doctrine with the 1982 edition ofFM 
100-5. 
The 1982 edition ofFM 100-5 faced yet more candidly than its 
predecessors the advantage of the Soviet Army and its allies would enjoy in 
any European showdown ... The means of gaining the initiative was no longer 
to be an effort to concentrate forces in quest of a local superiority unlikely to 
be attainable - though of course concentration of as much power as possible at 
decisive points remained a cardinal principle. Instead, the means of gaining 
initiative was to be agile maneuver, which would unhinge the enemy's 
psychological and physical balance and thereby permit the possession of the 
initiative to shift. 165 
In addition to the practical military reasons for adopting maneuver warfare, the 
doctrine also served to counter the "profound misgivings" which Weigley said were held by 
many in the army over the feared erosion of skills. The Army was not the only group that 
feared a disastrous erosion of war fighting skills. The military reformers believed that "Our 
last brilliant victory was in 1950: General Douglas MacArthur's audacious Inchon 
landing."166 The reformers believed that the "brilliant victory" was followed by " ... a bitter 
retreat through North Korea in the face of Chinese intervention and stalemate."167 The 






L _______________________________________________ _ 
Nam, the US military failed in the Mayaguez rescue handling the operation, according to 
Hart and Lind, " ... so badly that forty-one marines were killed rescuing forty seamen - who 
were in the process of being released, with their ship, by the Cambodians."168 The 
" .. .ignominious failure ... "169 of the Iran hostage rescue mission followed the Mayaguez 
incident. In 1983, there were two more indications of the problems in the US military. They 
were the Beirut bombing which left 241 marines dead and the invasion of Grenada. Hart and 
Lind believe the United States did succeed in Grenada. However; they were troubled by the 
performance of the US military: 
The once-elite Eighty-Second Airborne Division did poorly in the face 
of Cuban construction workers. It advanced only about five kilometers in 
three days170 
The failures in the 1980's occurred during a time of defense funding increases leading the 
reformers to believe that money alone would not solve the military's problems. The solution 
was seen as maneuver warfare. 
A common theme throughout all of the literature on maneuver warfare is that its 
execution requires more highly trained forces. Doctrine which espouses this requires an 
increased focus on professional war fighting skills. 
The US Marine Corps began to consider and eventually adopt the concept of 





Marine Corps' mission was different than the US Army, which prepared to face a massive 
Warsaw Pact ground force in Central Europe, it believed maneuver warfare was the solution 
for its problem. The US Marine Corps believed its role as an expeditionary force would 
almost invariably place it in a combat against numerically and even qualitatively (in terms of 
heavy equipment like tanks and artillery) superior opponents. General Gray experimented 
with maneuver warfare when he commanded the US Marine Corps' Second Division and it 




ill. IS MANEUVER WARFARE RELEVANT TO NAVAL WARFARE? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Maneuver warfare's distinctness derives from its incorporation of elements shared by 
other styles ofwarfare such as attrition, revolutionary, or information warfare. The warfare 
style of an armed force reflects the way it views combat and shapes the way it is organized, 
equipped, and trained. Maneuver warfare is based on the belief that victory comes 
predominantly from non-physical means. It views warfare as a time-competitive contest 
between two opposing commanders engaged in the Boyd Cycle. It is centered on the 
operational level of war and assigns primary importance to destroying an enemy's ability to 
conduct operations as a cohesive unit and on breaking his will. Maneuver warfare theorists 
believe that an enemy unable to function as a unit is defeated even if it is not completely 
physically destroyed. If physical destruction of the enemy is necessary for the 
accomplishment of the mission, maneuver warfare advocates promise the task will be 
accomplished more quickly, decisively, and with less cost to friendly forces. 
Other styles of warfare, like attrition, do not believe that victory results only from the 
utter physical destruction of enemy forces. Clausewitz recognized that "Military activity is 
never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral 
forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated."171 For example, before the Battle 
of Verdun, Falkenhayn believed France was at the brink of exhaustion and planned Verdun 
171 Clausewitz 13 7. 
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to ensure the " ... enemy's will to victory was broken and with that its desire to carry on the 
war."172 The Battle of Verdun was not even planned to create a breakthrough: 
Instead, a limited offensive against a vital part of the front would allow 
Germany to claim the initiative and compel France to "throw in everything 
they [had]. Ifthey [did,] the forces ofFrance [would] bleed to death ... 
whether we reach our goal or not...the moral effect on France [would be 
enormous]."173 
Here is an example of attrition employed at the operational level with the strategic objective 
of victory through non-physical causes- breaking the will of the French nation to continue 
the war. 
The difference in the focus on the utility of p~ysical destruction between warfare 
styles is a matter of degree. Maneuver warfare theory places much less importance on using 
physical destruction to influence the psychology of the enemy commander than attrition 
theory. Attrition theory relies to a greater extent on firepower to destroy the enemy's will 
and cohesion. Leonhard says destruction may be necessary for maneuver warfare depending 
on the circumstance faced by the commander. However, like other maneuver warfare 
advocates, he characterizes it as almost always the least efficient choice. 174 Maneuver 
theorists would point out that Falkenhayn's Verdun plan failed. The will ofFrance to 
continue the war was shaken but not broken and by the end of the battle, German " ... troop 
172Asprey, Robert B. The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff 
Conduct World War I. (New York: William Murrow and Company, Inc, 1991) 218. 
173 Asprey 220. 
174Leonhard 19-20. 
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morale was rapidly reaching rock bottom- 'many men refused to leave their trenches when 
ordered to attack."'175 Of course the French suffered gre_atly as well, but the German 
operational use of attrition failed. 
Nations choose maneuver warfare for several reasons. First, maneuver warfare is 
offered by advocates as a method to increase the overall quality of the armed force. 
Maneuver warfare theory's reliance on decentralized command and control places a premium 
on initiative at all command levels. For this style of war fighting to work, the training and 
professionalism of individual service members must be high so that their individual decisions 
and actions do not detract from the mission. The second reason is to overcome problems of 
quantitative superiority of potential enemies. Nations choose maneuver warfare when they 
cannot, because of resource limitations or lack of political will, maintain armed forces at the 
level of their adversaries. Finally, the defensive is superior in land warfare but the offensive 
is decisive. Maneuver warfare is seen as a way to overcome the inherent superiority ofthe 
defense and restore decisiveness to land warfare. The United States Army and Marines 
adopted maneuver warfare in the early 1980's primarily to overcome the quantitative 
superiority of the USSR ground forces. Also, the military reform movement seized upon 
maneuver warfare as a way to reverse what they considered to be a consistent 30-year pattern 
of military failure by the United States. Maneuver warfare was adopted by the US Army 
and Marines in a security environment which remained relatively stable for four decades. 
175 Asprey 225. 
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The security environment under which the US Navy has chosen to adopt maneuver warfare is 
very different. 
B. THE US NAVY'S CHOICE OF MANEUVER WARFARE 
The US Navy has chosen to adopt maneuver warfare under radically different 
circumstances than the Army and Marines. The world is in a period of transition after the 
end of the Cold War. There is no consensus among academics or policy makers as to what 
the end result of this transition will be. 176 
Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 
1986 requires the President of the United States to submit a national security strategy every 
year. The 1996 version demonstrates the difference in the security environment ofthe early 
nineteen-eighties and the present time. 
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America's security imperatives ... have fundamentally changed. The 
central challenge of the past half century - the threat of communist expansion 
-is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. 177 
The US Army of the Cold War faced a clear, singular threat: invasion ofWestem 
Europe by the massive ground forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Today, the Navy 
faces multiple, uncertain threats. The threats listed in the 1996 National Security Strategy 
include: ethnic conflict, rogue states, proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, large 
scale environmental degradation, rapid population growth, terrorism, international crime, and 
drug trafficking. Most are not expressed in terms of specific nations. 178 Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea are the only nations specifically listed in that document as near-term threats. The 
President's national security advisor, Anthony Lake, adds Cuba and Libya to what he terms 
the "backlash states." Backlash states are those "recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only 
choose to remain outside the family of nations, but also assault its basic values."179 However 
the near-term threat by these states to the interests of the United States pales in comparison to 
that posed by the erstwhile Soviet Union: 
For now, they lack the resources of a superpower, which would enable 
them to seriously threaten the democratic order being created around thein. 
Nevertheless, their behavior is often aggressive and defiant. The ties between 
177
"A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement." (February 1996) I. 
178National Security Strategy. I. 
179Lake, Anthony. "Confronting Backlash States." Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2. 
(March/April1994) 45. 
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them are growing as they seek to thwart or quarantine themselves from a 
global trend which they seem incapable of adapting. 180 
While originally adopted to face the massive Red Army, maneuver warfare has 
been retained by the US Army and Marine Corps for use against the smaller and lower 
quality armed forces of the backlash.states. Maneuver warfare's promise of more rapid, 
inexpensive, decisive victories than any other style of warfare is still sought. It is still 
seen as a way to overcome the inherent superiority of the defense on land. 
On the surface, the US Navy's choice of maneuver warfare seems inappropriate. 
Far from being outnumbered or suffering from a lack of professionalism, "Our military 
might is unparalleled."181 This is especially true for the Navy, the preeminent naval 
power in the world. The navies of all of the backlash states combined do not approach 
the size or sophistication of the US fleet. 
Another reason why nations have chosen to adopt maneuver warfare is to 
overcome the inherent strength ofthe defense in land combat. This situation is 180 
degrees different from that which exists at sea. Herbert Rosinski wrote of a 
" ... fundamental peculiarity of naval warfare [which] confronts a commander at sea with 
problems and perplexities unknown to his college on land .... "182 
180Lake. 45. 
181National Security Strategy I. 
182Rosinski, Herbert. "Mahan and World War II." The Development ofNaval Thought. 
Simpson III, B. Mitchell, ed. (Newport, Rhode Island: The Naval War College Press, 
1977) 23. 
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The normal situation between two opposing armies is one of more or 
less close contact, thanks to which the defender can frequently make a shrewd 
guess at the dispositions of his opponent, while the accidents of the ground, 
canalizing any attacker into certain predetermined channels, frequently enable 
him to concentrate his defense upon a few decisive lines and strengthen it by 
the utilization of suitable positions ... At sea, on the other hand, all conditions 
that tend to strengthen the defense vis-a-vis the attack are absene83 • 
Hughes was writing about the tactical level at a time when the operational level was not 
recognized by the United States Navy. However, his comments agree with Rosinski. 
Hughes says: 
All fleet operations based on defensive tactics (but not all defensive 
forces) are conceptually deficient. A successful defensive naval strategy 
entails a concentration of force and a successful attack. 184 
The reason that maneuver warfare at sea is not an illogical choice for the Navy is its 
emphasis on littoral war with the intention to directly intervene on land against ground-based 
forces. In the littoral, the defense is stronger than the offense and the US Navy will be 
outnumbered. 
Although limited in usefulness because he was only discussing surface ships, Ya'ari's 
statement on littoral warfare applies to the US Navy as a whole: 
The movement into the littoral is much more than a mere change of 
mission. The constraints in that "ballpark" are quite different from the ones 
that shaped the development of most current naval force structures. 185 
183Rosinski 23. 
184Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 38. 
185Ya'ari. 8. 
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Y a' ari lists specific aspects of the littoral which are different from fighting in the 
open ocean. These differences are a "matter of degree" rather than unique; however, he 
believes the degree of difference is so great that a force not trained and equipped specifically 
for the littoral will suffer at the hands of one that is. 186 
Because oftechnological advances in detection and tracking systems, Ya'ari states, a 
navy operating in the littoral will be under almost constant surveillance. This is coupled with 
the fact that many littoral areas constrict the movement of larger ships, similar to terrain 
having the ability to canalize a ground attack, and are surrounded by shorelines controlled by 
the enemy. 
[The shoreline] is not a passive entity. In fact, in this regime the 
opponent on land enjoys quite significant advantages. One of them is the 
modem coastal defense system, comprising of radar, electronic surveillance, 
anti-surface missiles, high speed surface combatants, and aviation. 187 
He neglects to add mines and diesel submarines, but correctly points out that the 
relatively discreet threat "bearings" of the open ocean become large threat "envelopes" in the 
littoral. The defensive is the stronger form of warfare in the littoral seas. 
Y a' ari believes a major reason why the defense is stronger in the littoral is due to 




hit and needs to hit it only once."188 He believes that a surface ship is a constant target in the 
littoral and always has to operate at a higher state of readiness than the defending force. 
Over time, this heightened state of readiness causes fatigue which reduces the effectiveness 
of the commander and crew. The defense has the advantage because it can fire numerous 
missiles and only has to attain a single hit to make a "mission" kill on most modern warships. 
The attacking force must defeat every inbound missile or it will lose the ability to conduct 
offensive operations, its only reason for being in the littoral. 
Not only is the defense stronger in the littoral, but according to Ya'ari, the US Navy 
will be inferior in numbers to the opposing force in the littoral. This inferiority will be 
asymmetrical. The US Navy will have a larger number of sophisticated warships but the 
opposing force will have a larger number of means to destroy them. The opposing force can 
deploy a large number, if not hundreds, of mines; aircraft; submarines; fast attack craft; and 
land, sea, air, and subsurface launched anti-ship missiles. A hit from any of these weapons 
systems is usually enough render a large sophisticated warship incapable of carrying out its 
mission. 
B0rrensen agrees that the defense is stronger in the littoral: 
The presence of shore batteries and shore based fighter aircraft 
changes the relationship between attack and defense that applied to naval 
battles on the open ocean. In coastal waters, the defense is a relatively 
stronger form of combat than it is on the open ocean. 189 
188Ya'ari. 11. 
18~0rrensen, Jacob. "The Seapower ofthe Coastal State." Journal of Strategic Studies 
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He classifies navies into two broad classes: "bluewater" and "coastal" navies. 
Bluewater navies conduct forward presence missions in peacetime and have the ability to 
achieve sea control and project offensive power far from their shores during war. Coastal 
navies do not. Their peacetime missions are to secure their nation's sovereign rights under 
the Law of the Sea Treaty. Their wartime mission is to prevent invasion from the sea. 
B0rrensen believes that the " ... comparative advantage of the Coastal Navy to the Bluewater 
Navy" is the " ... ability to navigate and operate in waters, and under conditions where the 
enemy may not. "190 A coastal navy, according to B0rrensen, is not naturally superior in 
numbers but can be because: 
The Coastal Navy operates, by definition, relatively close to the base 
at all times ... The Coastal Navies exploit this advantage by investing relatively 
less in the action radius of its ships, and in on-board amounts of ammunition 
and stores.191 
This allows a nation with a coastal navy to invest more in numbers of craft. They can have 
larger numbers of "less capable" platforms which a bluewater navy would not possess, but 
which are sufficient for its missions. 
The US Navy's choice of maneuver warfare is consistent with two of the three 
historical reasons why nations have opted for maneuver warfare. The Navy is attempting to 
189 ( ••• continued) 




overcome the superiority of the defense in the littoral and its asymmetrical inferiority in 
numbers. One promise of maneuver warfare advocates is that an armed force practicing 
maneuver warfare can overcome the superiority of the defense and the inferiority of numbers 
quickly, decisively, and with less casualties. 
Related to this promise are is another reason why the choice of maneuver warfare is 
logical for US Naval Forces: navies are expensive and take a long time to build, equip, train, 
and operate: 
Another constant of maritime warfare is that navies are difficult 
replace. For this reason ships of the line did not engage forts with the same 
number of guns, battleships did not venture into minable waters, and aircraft 
carriers did not attack airfields that based similar numbers of aircraft. Ships 
did attempt such actions if they had preponderant force in the sea-shore battle 
and if they had sea control. The Gallipoli operations in the spring of 1915 
illustrate both the prerequisite preponderance of force and the hazards of 
engaging shore batteries in minable waters. Three French and British 
battleships were sunk and a British battle cruiser was damaged, and the fleet's 
attempt to penetrate the Dardenelles was called off on the very brink of 
success. 192 
The US Navy presumes it will have sea control from its strategic base to the littoral. 
It does not presume it will control the littoral: 
Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive 
directly from command of the high seas. It is an objective which requires our 
focused skills and resources. 193 
192Hughes. 182. 
19311 
... From The Sea." 7. 
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Both B0rrensen and Ya'ari believe that the present US Navy does not possess the resources 
to have the "prerequisite preponderance of force" to operate successfully in the littoral. It 
needs the force-multiplying effect offered by maneuver warfare to successfully carry out its 
new strategic focus. 
The US Navy's choice of maneuver warfare is logical and consistent with historical 
reasons why other nations chose that style of warfare. However, maneuver warfare was 
developed by land warfare practitioners and it remains to be seen if its essential elements are 
transferable across warfare media. The remainder of the chapter will examine this question. 
The Boyd Cycle will be examined first to see if it can be shown to exist in naval warfare. 
Next the relevance of the maneuver warfare theory view of command and control, the 
battlefield, and the other essential elements will be examined. 
C. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MODERN MANEUVER WARFARE THEORY 
AND NAVAL WARFARE 
1. The Boyd Cycle 
Maneuver warfare theorists believe that Boyd's theory of combat commander 
decision-making is correct and universal. Yet the transferability ofBoyd's theory, based on 
the experience ofF-86 pilots in the Kor~an War, poses a number of problems. It'was based 
on a the interaction unitary actor's at the tactical level, ie., the pilots of the MiG and the F-86, 
yet it is considered by maneuver warfare adherents to be the model for all warfare. Boyd 
assumed the pilots were always be able to correctly observe the situation, orient themselves, 
decide what action to take, and implement the action. The process continued until one side 
was defeated. According to the maneuver theorists, victory is due only to moving faster 
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through the cycle than the enemy. Each actor makes the "correct" decision for the situation 
he observes. The loser makes his "correct" decision for a situation that is no longer valid. 
By virtue of simultaneously being the intelligence, command and control, and combat 
force, the unitary actor involved in single aerial combat has unique advantages over 
commanders of other types of combat units. This tempo-based model of combat command 
decision making which later became the basis of a warfare style reduces the importance of 
other elements of the process. 
Still, the theory has merit. All combat commanders can be shown to go through the 
OODA loop, even if they do not consciously use the model or terms. The most troubling 
aspect of maneuver warfare theory is the conclusion drawn about the central importance of 
time. Moving faster than the opponent through the decision cycle is not the only way to 
victory. For example, if one side removed an opponent's reconnaissance force, the opponent 
would not be able to accurately observe the situation. Following the Boyd Cycle, he would 
not be able to adequately orient himself, decide on a course of action, and implement the 
action. Similarly, if one side removed another's ability to transmit orders, then the correct 
observation and orientation become meaningless because they cannot be accomplished. 
These actions also could lead to victory. 
All of maneuver warfare theory is not wrong. It still can be based on the Boyd Cycle 
and the belief that victory comes largely from non-physical causes. Only the method of 
exploiting the enemy's Boyd Cycle can be greatly expanded. Relative time difference in the 
Boyd Cycle is not the only method of gaining victory. Victory can result from moving 
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faster through the cycle, but can also ensue from the destruction of one its critical nodes or 
disruption of the transition through the nodes. 
The Boyd Cycle can be shown to exist in naval warfare. Hughes' dictum "fire 
effectively first" can be rephrased in maneuver warfare terms: fire on an enemy first because 
it changes the situation he is oriented to, making his decision and action inappropriate. His 
observation of and orientation to the situation changes from attempting to locate, track, and 
engage the enemy force to countering the incoming threat. Similarly, the importance Hughes 
places on "counter-scouting"194 is a means to disrupt the enemy's Boyd Cycle by removing 
his ability to observe. 
Naval Doctrine Publication 6, "Naval Comm~nd and Control" describes the Boyd 
Cycle as the decision and execution cycle of all warfare. Unfortunately, the conclusion 
Naval Doctrine Command draws is also ofthe singular importance of establishing greater 
speed through consecutive Boyd Cycle's than the enemy. It states, "The essential lesson of 
the decision and execution cycle is the absolute importance of generating tempo [emphasis in 
original]."195 Doctrine Command does say that " ... because orientation is largely based on 
information received from observation of the battle space, we can influence our adversary's 
orientation and thus increase his sense of disorder - by disrupting his ability to observe the 
battle space."196 However, this is done only to "increase the differential in our relative 
194Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 169-170. 
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tempos"197 and this is not a sufficient condition alone to create victory. The Boyd Cycle 
exists in naval warfare, but the Boyd Cycle-based definition of maneuver warfare must be 
expanded to include other methods than superior cycle tempo to achieve victory. 
2. Command and Control 
Decentralized command and control is seen by Naval Doctrine Command as the only 
way to ensure the rapid movement through the Boyd Cycle in naval combat. This belief and 
the methods adapted are the same as in ground combat: mission orders based on the 
commander's intent. Of all the essential elements of maneuver warfare on land, 
decentralized command and control through mission type orders is probably the most readily 
transferable to naval warfare. Decentralized command and control has historical basis in the 
naval services due to the traditiomillimitations on communications systems. Naval Doctrine 
Command states: 
Because naval forces have traditionally operated independently at 
great distances from U.S. based support, command of naval operations has 
been- by necessity -decentralized. Before the advent of radio 
communications, a naval commander was relatively autonomous, unable to 
receive direction from ashore or to exert control over any other ships or forces 
beyond his own line of sight. 198 
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Naval Doctrine Command is not alone in this belief The phrase above echoes what 
Royal Navy Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach said in the forward to Naval Command 
and Control: 
Two hundred years ago if a government wished to carry out an 
operation against another power it picked the Force Commander, gave him the 
instructions and the necessary backing to assemble and equip his Force, and 
the rest was up to him. Long months later a corvette might bring home a 
dispatch indicating the outcome of the operation. 199 
Technology has greatly reduced the problem of communications: 
In the early 1970's, the Navy was dependent upon 100 words per 
minute teletype, high (HF) radio and speed key communications at 30 words 
per minute ... [and]. .. was satisfied ifHF communications support could be 
maintained at 90 percent effectiveness. Today- primarily because of satellite· 
communications - nothing less than 1 00 percent effectiveness with no garble 
and high data rates are the norm. 200 
Although new technology allows more centralized control of naval forces, the need 
for decentralized command and control has not diminished. In the littoral environment it has 
increased for two reasons. First, a naval force operating in the littoral will, by definition, be 
operating much closer to shore. Distance in the battle space directly translates into reaction 
time201 . The less distance from the threat, the less reaction time. Less reaction time forces 
199pakenham, W.T.T. Naval Command and Control. (London: Brassey's Defense 
Publishers, 1989) vii. 
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commanders to allow subordinates more independent actions. Compounding the problem of 
shortened reaction times, is the multi-directional and multi-modal nature of the threat in the 
littoral. A force in the littoral will have less chance to predict where an enemy attack may 
come from than on the open ocean. The attack will come with more surprise, further limiting 
reaction time. This situation also requires mission orders based on the commanders intent. 
The commander's intent is also a historical part of naval operations arising from poor 
communications, although the modern term was not used. The Naval Doctrine Command is 
correct when it states: 
These characteristics of naval operations demanded that a senior 
commander state his intention clearly, to ensure that his ships' captains and 
landing force commanders operated according to the larger plan. Armed with 
an understanding of their senior's intent, the subordinate commanders were 
expected to conduct a wide range of operations on their own initiative. This 
style of command has been an enduring characteristic of naval operations and 
continues to distinguish the way naval commanders exercise command and 
control today.202 
John Horsfield studied combat leadership in the Royal Navy from the period of the 
Napoleonic Wars until the end World War Two. He says that commanders could not give 
detailed instructions and instead had to state what they wanted accomplished. For example, 
"Admiralty instructions, because of the remoteness of distance and the time lag in receiving 
them, were often merely essays in speculation as far as the immediate situation was 
202
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concerned."203 Horsfield believes a major reason for Nelson's repeated successes was 
because he ensured his subordinate commanders fully understood his intentions: 
Nelson had explained fully to his subordinates what his schemes and 
intentions were, and he trusted them to do their best to carry them out ... 
Nelson before each of his battles assembled his captains, often at a dinner 
gathering, to ensure that all were one with his ideas. 204 
Horsfield gives an example of correspondence from a Captain Brey, who attended 
such a gathering before the Battle of the Nile: 
Everyone of the captains of his Squadron was most thoroughly 
acquainted; and upon surveying the situation of the Enemy they could 
ascertain with precision what were the ideas and the intentions oftheir 
commander without the aid of any further instructions. 205 
Nelson became a traditional model ofleadership for the Royal Navy. The US Navy was 
patterned after the Royal Navy and Nelson became an example for that navy too. His 
reliance on telling his subordinates his intent and then allowing them to act became a 
tradition in the US Navy. 
The choice of maneuver warfare for naval forces operating in the littoral is logical. 
The definition of maneuver warfare as defeating the enemy through destruction ofhis 
commander's decision cycle is also relevant to naval warfare, especially in the littoral, even 
if maneuver warfare's view ofvictory only through moving more rapidly through the 
203Horsfield, John. The Art ofLeadership in War: The Royal Nayy From the Age of 




decision cycle is too limited. The command and control system of mission orders based on 
the commanders intent, which maneuver theorists believe is the only way to successfully 
practice maneuver warfare, is not only the historical (though not called by the same terms in 
history) method of naval command and control but also is relevant and vital to success in 
littoral warfare 
3. Focus of the Effort 
It is difficult to see the relevance, however, ofthe second essential element of the 
maneuver warfare command and control system. The focus of the effort has no comparison 
in naval history. The nearest comparison is the concept of the "capital ship." The focus of 
. the effort on land is where the commander believes he will achieve a decision. According to 
maneuver theory, it is usually expressed as a unit. All other units support the focus of the 
effort. At first glance, it appears the concept of capital ship serves this role in naval battle. 
The capital ship was the warship that was supreme at sea. In other words, it was the ship 
with which naval commanders believed they would achieve decision. Other platforms 
scouted or provided security for the capital ship, which was to engage the enemy's capital 
ships. In maneuver warfare terms, units not designated the focus of effort by the 
commanding officer supported the focus of the effort. 
Viewing capital ships in this light is incorrect. The difference between the historical 
development of fleets and fleet operations organized around capital ships and the focus of the 
effort is that the latter implies a choice. The commander observes the situation, orients 
himself to the situation, decides what his focus of effort will be, and then acts with it. The 
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traditional naval commander had no choice but to achieve decision with his line of battle 
consisting of capital ships. The focus of the effort in littoral warfare may be land or sea. 
Corbett believed the concept of capital ships developed from the fact that " ... in almost 
all eras of naval warfare, fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to differentiate into groups 
in accordance with the primary function each class was designed to serve."206 He states the 
practice became standardized after the Anglo-Dutch Wars. Ships were grouped into three 
classes: ships capable of service in the line of battle, cruisers, and others. Corbett called the 
groups battleships, cruisers, and flotilla ships. 207 Russian Admiral Makarov agreed with the 
division of naval forces into three groups according to function calling the groups 
" ... squadron ironclads ... frigates,and ... other smaller vessels."208 
Corbett, Makarov, and another well known naval writer, Colomb, used different 
terms for capital ships, but all agree that a commander theoretically achieved decision with 
them. Corbett argued about the proper role of cruisers but did not argue with the supreme 
role of the battleship or with the belief that only battleships could fight battleships. "It is 
perfectly true that the control [of communications, upon which Corbett believes control of 
206Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1988). 107. 
207Corbett 112. 
208Makarov, S.O. Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics. (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990) 243. 
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the sea rests on] depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile 
battle-fleet, as it usually is."209 Makarov believed: 
... size determines strength. The battle ship has been at all times more 
powerful than the frigate, and therefore there was no occasion to place the 
frigate in the center of the line so to weaken one portion thereo£210 
This was also true for " ... vessels of smaller dimensions, such as torpedo cruisers and torpedo 
boats."2ll Colomb agreed with Corbett and Makarov stating: 
The establishment ofthe line-of-battle not only differentiated a 
powerful class of ships for taking part in the fighting formation, but ... it 
excluded the smaller classes of ships from taking part in the general 
action ... We thus get a tendency towards such a differentiation of naval forces 
as would set apart a line of battle those ships specifically designed to fight in a 
line; that citadel as it were of naval power, the arrangement of naval force 
before which every other nature of naval power must bow, and which could 
not be overcome but by a greater quantity of like force. 212 
The differentiation of naval forces led to the status of the capital ship as "the citadel 
of naval power." Like ships fought like ships. What Brodie called the race between 
protection and penetration led to huge increase in the cost of capital ships lessening the 





213Brodie, Bernard. Seapower in the Machine Age. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1943) 238. 
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that it was necessary to concentrate the fleet. Concentration also limited the choice to 
determine a focus of effort. 
The focus of effort is relevant to a navy concentrating on littoral warfare. The goal of 
the new strategic focus of the US Navy is to directly intervene in events on land. Its main 
targets and opposition usually will be land based forces. The US Navy does not intend to go 
abroad into the littoral to destroy coastal navies. 
Uhlig's stated the historical "goods and services" provided by a navy were to allow 
friendly shipping to flow, prevent enemy shipping from flowing, and land troops as 
necessary. "The obvious, the best and the shortest way to obtain such command has always 
. been to seek out the enemy's main forces and destroy them."214 
Destruction of a littoral nation's fleet will not have the same effect with the US 
Navy's present strategic focus. The Navy, operating jointly with other US or coalition 
forces, must destroy or render ineffective a littoral nation's entire defense system, ofwhich 
its fleet and even a well-integrated coastal system is only a part, to have a similar effect that 
destruction of the. enemy fleet provided under its present concept of operations. Destruction 
of the fleet will only provide security to allow the force to achieve the commander's intent. 
Therefore, it will be vital to designate a focus of effort in order to maintain security, 
concentration, and unity of effort. The goal will not be to sink every missile boat or 
submarine, or to clear every mine, but to carry out some task against a land objective. If the 
214Rosinski, Herbert. "Command of the Sea." The Development ofNaval Thought. 
Simpson III, B. Mitchell ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977) 5. 
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US Navy will be outnumbered against littoral nations, it will need to focus on achieving the 
commander's intent. The traditional notion of destroying the enemy "fleet" will divert 
strength away from the objective. A modified concept of surfaces and gaps is necessary. 
4. Surfaces and Gaps 
Surfaces and gaps are a concept used in land maneuver warfare because, according to 
Lind, it is how a ground commander sees the battlefield. It takes into account terrain and the 
enemy. Surfaces are enemy strengths or impassable terrain. Gaps are enemy weaknesses or 
traversable terrain. This concept doesn't directly apply to traditional concepts of war at sea 
or warfare in the littoral. In traditional war at sea, the terrain mattered less than it did on land 
warfare because it equally effected both sides. 
In littoral warfare, if only surface ships are considered, terrain is very important. 
Larger ocean going ships will be denied operational depth due to draft restrictions, enemy 
mines, and missile batteries. However, the US Navy doesn't plan to fight with surface ships 
alone. Effective use of aircraft, countermining, and cruise missiles can reduce the effect of 
terrain. 
The concept of surfaces and gaps is useful if terrain is removed as an important 
element and the enemy is focused on. Strengths and weaknesses are a much better way of 
looking at the problem. For example. Ya'ari and B0rrensen list a number of strengths of a 
coastal navy and weaknesses ofbluewater navy operating in the littoral. Ya'ari lists the 
strengths as ability to blend in with the terrain and neutral shipping, lack of constraining 
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drafts, and greater numbers of crafts available. 215 B0rrensen agrees with Ya' ari and adds 
the availability of shore based air cover and shore batteries. 216 Y a' ari, basing his theory on 
the Israeli Navy's combat experiences, only talks about surface ships and not a combined 
force like the US Navy. B0rrensen is more useful because he gives strengths and 
weaknesses ofboth types of maritime forces. 
According to Y a' ari, the bluewater navy will send its big ships in to the littoral to be 
defeated by superior surveillance, combined arms, and clever use of terrain by the littoral 
state. His goal is to suggest that today' s surface ships are ill-designed to fight in the littoral 
and suggests the adoption of a littoral warfare doctrine for submarines. He explicitly 
dismisses the ability of using new tactics or warfare styles to overcome problems faced by 
bluewater navies in the littoral. Y a' ari also dismisses synergism, which he defines as the 
combined effects of several types of platforms, as being able to solve the bluewater navy's 
problem in the littoral environment.217 In other words, maneuver warfare alone is not a 
sufficient to solve the problems the US Navy will face in the littoral. Ya'ari believes littoral 
warfare is fundamentally a technological problem primarily requiring a technological 
solution. 
There is a lot of truth in Ya' ari' s belief and the technological element of the littoral 





Sea," the Navy planned to " ... examine functions and capabilities, seeking to eliminate areas 
of redundancy and enhance areas considered deficient in light of the shift in strategy."218 The 
main technological deficiency, noted by Owens, was evident in Desert Storm: 
... weapons, systems, and techniques that we had honed for open-ocean 
engagements ... were all ruled out either by the context of the battle or the 
complexities ofthe sea-land interface in the littoral.219 
The need to " ... procure equipment systems to support [" ... From The Sea"] and remain 
ahead of the global technological revolution in military systems,"220 was listed as an 
immediate task in that document. However, research and development and procurement of 
new weapons systems designed for littoral warfare takes time. The US Navy wants to 
remain engaged forward in the mean time. Maneuv~r warfare is a valid solution to the 
littoral warfare problem until the new systems reach the operating forces. It will remain 
useful afterwards because of the US Navy's inferiority in numbers and the superiority of the 
defense in the littoral arena. 
ModifYing and applying its essential element of strengths and weaknesses is a vital 
part. The littoral nation has exploitable weaknesses. What both B0rrensen and Ya' ari list as 
strengths are only strengths if a bluewater navy attempts to fight a coastal navy in the same 
manner it would fight a bluewater force. Also, most of the strengths are tactical strengths, 
maneuver warfare focuses on the operational level. A coastal navy's main operational level 
218
" ... From the Sea" 12. 
2190wens 4. 
220
" ... From the Sea" 15. 
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exploitable weaknesses are circumscribed range, payload, detection capabilities, anti-air 
defenses, and electronic countermeasures of its units. The US Navy conducting a campaign 
against a littoral nation has advantages if it applies a maneuver warfare approach. 
)First, it has vast operational depth. The open ocean provides a secure base for the US 
Navy beyond the enemy's capability to attack or effectively locate it. Its forces can operate 
in areas which the coastal nation cannot because of fuel or sea state restrictions. In other 
words, while a bluewater force is canalized in the littoral, the coastal navy is canalized to the 
littoral. The US Navy will have the operational initiative. While the defense is stronger in 
the littoral as it is on land, the offensive is decisive in the littoral as well. 
Second, Ya'ari is wrong on synergism. For example, aviation can have a major effect 
in the littoral. He is correct to point out that a patrol boat can operate in shallow waters with 
little or no operational restrictions compared to an ocean going vessel. · It is also true that it 
possesses greater tactical speed. However, an aircraft is completely unaffected by restricted 
waters and its speed is far greater than any patrol craft. Because of weight restrictions, the 
patrol boat will not have adequate air defenses or electronic counter measures. The 
maneuver warfare solution is to send an aircraft, a strength, against an enemy weakness, an 
patrol boat. 
Thirdly, the littoral nation is very reliant on shore-based support for intelligence, air 
support, and logistics. According to Ya' ari, a surface ship is little more than a large, nearly 
immobile target in the littoral. A littoral nation's fixed land-based communications, 
intelligence, and logistics structure are likewise large immobile targets. The dependence on 
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the shore structure is the littoral enemy's critical vulnerability and a way to directly destroy 
the observation and orientation node of his Boyd Cycle or disrupt the transition between his 
decision and action nodes. 
The concept of reconnaissance pull has been the historical method of reconnaissance 
for war at sea. The Navy, which has by necessity focused on the enemy for war at sea, 
always followed a reconnaissance system more closely related to the land combat concept of 
the reconnaissance pull rather than the command push. The enemy had to be located first 
and then attacked without keeping forces in reserve. Locating the enemy could be a major 
effort. Once found, the enemy was attacked. The command push at sea, in which a 
commander decides where he wants to attack and then sends out his reconnaissance, made 
little sense. 
Technology plus the US Navy's focus on influencing land events and targeting 
ground forces permits it to adopt the command push method of reconnaissance. This form of 
reconnaissance is anathema to ground warfare advocates because it does not permit the 
exploitation of gaps. With a reconnaissance style more closely like the reconnaissance pull 
method, the Navy presently has the proper reconnaissance mind set for maneuver warfare. It 
should not change. 
5. The Role of Firepower, Combined Arms, and Fire Support 
Firepower, combined arms, and fire support are viewed very differently by maneuver 
warfare advocates and traditional naval theorists. Effective firepower was the most 
important aspect of naval battles. Early location ofthe enemy allowing one side to attack 
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effectively first was the key to success. Combined arms, the use of two or more types of 
weapons to achieve effects greater than their use singly, was not attempted. Combined arms 
effects have been achieved accidentally. The US Navy torpedo squadron attacks on the 
Japanese in the Battle of Midway brought down the Japanese combat air patrol from to flight 
levels from which they could not effectively deal with dive bombers. It was not possible or 
realistic to develop doctrinal principles based on this chance success. 
The US Navy, the employment of different types of weapons has usually been 
sequential and based on range. Defense in depth of carrier battle groups exemplified this. 
Enemy bombers or ships with cruise missiles would be attacked by aircraft first. "Leakers" 
would next be attacked by surface vessels anti-air or anti-ship missiles. Next, remaining 
enemy forces would be attacked by ships' guns and finally by point defense systems. 
Attacks on enemy forces would also usually be made by submarines or aircraft first, then 
ship launched cruise missiles, and then guns. 
Attempts to combine weapons to magnify effects were not made. The need to fire 
effectively first combined with the range and destructiveness of cruise missiles reduced the 
value of combined arms. In the littoral environment, this is no longer true. 
A force operating from the sea in the littoral, as well as it opponent, will operate 
within simultaneous effective ranges of many different weapons systems. Due to the 
overlapping ranges of weapons systems in the littoral, many more opportunities to make the 
combined effect of different types of weapons systems greater than the sum of their separate 
parts will exist. The maneuver warfare view of firepower and combined arms can become 
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useful to maneuver warfare in the littoral. This is one of the least understood and developed 
of the essential elements in the naval interpretation of maneuver warfare. 
6. Counter Attacks and the Reserve 
Other essential elements of maneuver warfare which have no major historical basis in 
war at sea are counter attacks and the use of reserves. The focus on the destruction of the 
enemy fleet in traditional US naval thought led to an operational strategy designed to bring 
about a fleet engagement. In that engagement, the first effective attack usually determined 
the victor. Forces not engaged were forces wasted.221 Counter attacks were also less 
valuable than attacking effectively first. The changing strategic focus of the US Navy brings 
a new importance to the use of counter attacks and the role of reserves. 
The objective of campaigns will not be the destruction of a littoral nation's naval 
forces or naval-oriented defense system. Destruction of its naval oriented defense systems 
may of course be necessary, but only to the extent that it enables the commanders intentto be 
accomplished. The commander's intent, according to the US Navy's new strategic focus, 
will be based on direct intervention on the ground. Destruction of the enemy fleet is 
relegated to a security mission and will probably only rarely, if ever, be assigned the focus of 
the effort. The focus of effort will be directed towards some objective on land that will 
directly cause the commander's intent to be realized. This move from war on the high seas 
221Hughes. Fleet Tactics. 197. 
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to the littoral makes the maneuver warfare concept of the reserves and the use of counter 
attacks relevant to the Navy's new strategic concept. 
7. Intangibles 
The role of intangibles is directly transferable from maneuver warfare on land to 
maneuver warfare at sea. The preeminent role of intangibles in victory is one of the two 
definitional pillars of the modem concept of maneuver warfare. Adopting maneuver warfare 
at sea without the same role of intangibles is impossible. 
The limited number of discreet fighting units used in naval combat magnifies the 
effect of intangibles. Subunits, such as a department on a ship, are incapable of independent 
actions outside of their parent unit. Of all operational level military forces, a naval force 
most closely approaches Boyd's view of unitary command and control. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Naval Doctrine Command's belief that maneuver warfare is the war fighting style 
which will best supports the Navy's new strategic focus is a logical solution to the problems 
it will face in the littoral. It is a choice consistent with two of the three reasons why nations 
have historically chosen this style of fighting. Maneuver warfare's essential elements are 
relevant to warfare at sea with little change. The term "at sea" must not be too narrowly 
defined to mean the traditional view of naval combat between two bluewater navies. The 
term needs to be thought of as "based at sea". In this sense, maneuver warfare at sea is more 
accurately described as a style of warfare for sea-based forces attempting to directly 
intervene on the land against ground-based force. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The modem concept of maneuver warfare was developed by William Lind and the 
military reformers. It is based on the belief that victory in warfare comes predominantly 
from non-physical causes. Maneuver theory specifically states that the only way to achieve 
this sort of victory is to operate at a faster Boyd Cycle tempo than the enemy. Maneuver 
warfare was seen as valid solution to the problems facing the US Army and Marine Corps in 
the 1980's. 
Naval Doctrine Command " ... was established to provide doctrinal foundation for 
naval forces."222 The Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations for Resources, Program 
Requirements and Assessments says in Force 2001, " .. .it serves as the primary authority for 
the development, dissemination, and evaluation ofnaval doctrine ... the explicit statement of 
how we fight [emphasis in original]. "223 Doctrine Command called maneuver warfare the 
preferred method of fighting for the naval services in Naval Warfare. It did so without 
addressing whether the concept, which was developed out of land warfare experience to 
solve specific problems ofland warfare, was relevant to the US Navy's new strategic focus. 
222F orce 2001: A Program Guide to the U.S. Nayy.· 1994 Edition. (Washington, DC: 
Deputy Chief ofNaval Operations, Resources, Program Requirements and Assessments 
(N8), 1994) 19. 
223Force 2001 19. 
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The US Army and Marine Corps turned to maneuver warfare in a period 
characterized by certainty in the security environment to counter a long-standing, known 
threat. The US Navy, on the other hand, turned to the same solution to counter unknown 
threats. Maneuver warfare is relevant and vital to the new strategic focus of direct 
intervention from the sea and the targeting land-based forces. Instituting new warfare 
doctrine is the only method available in the short-term to allow the Navy to be effective in 
the littoral with weapon systems designed for traditional open ocean warfare. It is also a 
long-term solution because of the operational conditions of the littoral arena. 
B. MANEUVER WARFARE AND "THE NAVY AFTER NEXT" 
Maneuver warfare is relevant for the present security environment in which the US 
Navy will operate. Paul Bracken wrote "The Military After Next" in 1993 and stated that the 
article was not intended to provide guidance on the shape of the future security environment. 
Instead, the article was offered to serve as: 
A powerful technique by which to judge whether current plans and 
debates are far enough ahead oftoday's problems, and whether U.S. armed 
forces will incorporate innovations in operations, technology, new 
architecture, and radically different doctrines in ways that make the 
innovations a real part of the forces designed?24 
His technique divided the military into "the next military" and "the military after 
next." The next military is one that is based on today' s security environment and operational 
224Bracken, Paul. "The Military After Next." The Washington Quarterly 16, no 4. 
(1993) 157-158 
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needs and is an evolutionary improvement over the present military. The military "after 
next" is defined as one which will begin to be fielded twenty years from now. It will be 
based on a different security environment and advanced technology, and may be radically 
different in size, organization, and orientation than today' s or the next military. 225 
Bracken also classified threats into three broad groups. "A" competitors are nation-
state peer competitors. The next classification are "B" competitors. These are nation-states 
with military capabilities similar to the present armed forces oflran, Iraq, or North Korea. 
The last classification are the underdeveloped military nations or non-state threats, labeled 
group "C."226 He believes that planning fcir the next military is based on defeating group 
"B" nations. The main problem in US strategic thought, according to Bracken, is that the 
debate over the military after next is not about how to defeat a group "A" challenger that may 
arise over the next two decades, but whether the next military should be primarily focused on 
defeating group "B" nations or dealing with the problems associated with group "C" 
nations. 227 
Bracken does not differentiate between any ofthe services. The Navy's new strategic 
focus and adoption of maneuver warfare is useful for "the next navy" and "the navy after 
next." Meeting part ofhis description of the next military, the Navy's new strategic concept 





However, its concept does not suffer from "strategic tunnel vision"228 for two reasons. First, 
Bracken's fear is that the United States short term view will cause it to be a victim of the 
revolution in military affairs. His fear is unfounded where the Navy is concerned. He states: 
In the military sphere it is likely that the nature of warfare brought on 
by the enabling power of new technologies combined with fundamental 
changes in doctrine, employment concepts, and force structures will later the 
character of warfare to a degree witnessed only in periods of military 
revolution. 229 
A primary cause of the Navy adopting its new strategic concept was "the enabling 
power of technology" which has blurred the boundaries between the warfare media. Also, 
" ... From The Sea" was a fundamental change in the Navy's employment concept and 
maneuver warfare at sea is an attempt to fundamentally change the Navy's war fighting 
doctrine. The character of naval warfare is changing to a revolutionary degree, far beyond a 
simple reaction to present security conditions and operational needs. 
The second reason why Bracken's criticism does not apply is that the time it takes to 
design and build naval weapons systems is long and their expected service life is normally 
measured in decades. For example, the USS Midway (CV 41) was commissioned in 1943 
and remained in active service until 1991. The US Navy can ill afford not to consider the 




C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The US Navy's move to adopt maneuver warfare for naval forces is a logical, long-
term choice. Many of the essential elements of maneuver warfare such as the Boyd Cycle, 
mission orders based on the commander's intent, and the reconnaissance pull method are 
already present in the US Navy today, although the same terminology is not used. Other 
concepts such as focus of the effort, combined arms, counterattacks, and the reserve are 
relevant and vital to littoral warfare but need to be further developed and adopted. 
The most important change the US Navy must make to maneuver warfare theory in 
its adoption, is to expand the view of how victory can be achieved. Destruction of one of the 
nodes ofthe Boyd Cycle or disruption of an enemy's transition through the cycle must also 
be seen as sufficient to result in victory. Presently, superior relative tempo through the cycle 
is seen as the only method of victory. Doctrine, "shared thinking" according to Naval 
Doctrine Command, will limit a commander's method to achieve victory. 
The second change the US Navy must make to successfully institute maneuver 
warfare for sea-based forces is in its weapons systems development and procurement 
philosophy. Weapons system development should place emphasis on the integrated use of 
combined arms to enable commanders to identify and exploit surfaces and gaps. Importance 
must be placed on the synergistic effect of all weapons systems. Particular emphasis must be 
placed on weapons allowing the Navy to directly target and influence the land battle as part 
of a joint force. 
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Finally, Naval Doctrine Command was correct to advocate maneuver warfare as the 
warfare style best suited for the US Navy's new strategic concept. However, if it is to 
successfully carry out its mission of turning the strategic concept articulated in " ... From The 
Sea" to doctrinal reality, it must do better at convincing the operating forces that maneuver 
warfare is the proper choice for warfare in the littoral. Doctrine Command must better 
educate war fighters on maneuver warfare. This is necessary to allow the concept to be 
exercised, tested, and practically developed, transforming it from doctrinal theory to 
operational reality. 
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